The Terrorist Is A Star!: Regulating Media Coverage of Publicity-Seeking Crimes by Ghetti, Michelle Ward
Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 60 | Issue 3 Article 3
6-2008
The Terrorist Is A Star!: Regulating Media
Coverage of Publicity-Seeking Crimes
Michelle Ward Ghetti
Southern University Law Center
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, Constitutional Law
Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ghetti, Michelle Ward (2008) "The Terrorist Is A Star!: Regulating Media Coverage of Publicity-Seeking Crimes," Federal
Communications Law Journal: Vol. 60: Iss. 3, Article 3.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol60/iss3/3
The Terrorist Is A Star!: Regulating
Media Coverage of Publicity-Seeking
Crimes
Michelle Ward Ghetti*
I. P REFA CE ................................................................................... 482
II. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 487
III. THE PROBLEM OF MEDIA COVERAGE OF
PUBLICITY-SEEKING CRIMES ................................................... 490
A . Intim idation ...................................................................... 495
B . Im itation ........................................................................... 496
C . Im m unization ................................................................... 497
D . Im perilization ................................................................... 498
1. Media dissemination of information ....................... 498
2. Media interference with law enforcement ............... 499
IV. THE MEDIA'S REASONING ........................................................ 500
V . SO LU TION S ............................................................................... 504
A. Noncontent-related Suggestions ...................................... 504
B. Content-related Suggestions ............................................ 505
C. Providing Information ..................................................... 506
VI. THE FIRST AMENDMENT .......................................................... 509
A . P rior R estraint ................................................................. 512
B. Subsequent Punishment ................................................... 516
* Louisiana Outside Counsel For Health and Ethics Professor, Southern University Law
Center.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL
C. Access Restrictions .......................................................... 519
D . F CC Regulation ............................................................... 522
V II. CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 524
VIII. APPENDIX A: NONSTATE SPONSORED TERRORISTIC CRIMES
COMMITTED FROM 1958 TO 1982 ............................................. 527
IX. APPENDIX B: NONSTATE SPONSORED TERRORISTIC CRIMES
COMMITTED FROM 1982 TO PRESENT ...................................... 530
"There is no need to cry in the wilderness when anyone so inclined can plead
his case on national television."'
I. PREFACE
The following piece, written twenty-five years ago,2 is remarkable for
four reasons: (1) it illustrates that terrorism and/or publicity-seeking crime
and the media coverage of it were concerns being discussed twenty-five
years ago; 3 (2) it is prophetic as to many issues;4 (3) there has been little
development in the law in this area,5 despite an explosion of both broadcast
technology/coverage 6 and publicity-seeking crime7 since that time; and (4)
there has been little to no coverage of it in legal journals.8
In the twenty-five years prior to the Article being written in 1982,
approximately sixty incidents of non-state sponsored terrorism were
documented within the United States or targeting United States
citizens-more than there have been since 1982, although much of it was
1. Pohlmann & Foley, Terrorism in the 70's: Media's Connection, 61 NAT'L FORUM 33,
34(1981).
2. The following piece was written for a First Amendment course at Southern Methodist
University School of Law in the fall of 1982 where the author was finishing the final thirty
hours of coursework toward graduation at Louisiana State University Law School. Although
receiving an almost perfect score in the class, it was rejected for publication as a comment in
the Louisiana Law Review because it was considered too controversial for a student piece.
3. See Appendix A, infra, for a listing of terrorist crimes committed in America or
against Americans in the twenty-five years prior to 1982. See also the various books,
magazine articles, and law journal articles cited throughout the piece describing the discourse
on media coverage of terrorism at that time.
4. See, e.g., the discussion of the expected impact of television news in the future infra
notes 71-75.
5. See discussion infra at notes 31-39.
6. See discussion infra at notes 14-24.
7. See Appendix B and note 26, infra, for a list of terrorist crimes committed in the
United States or against Americans since that time. Actually, terrorist crime in the United
States has decreased since 1982, although international terrorism has increased.
8. See discussion infra at notes 39-40.
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due to the racial unrest and antiwar sentiment in the United States at that
time. 9 By 1982, media coverage of such acts was being discussed within the
media itself,'° in general publications," and in higher education journals,
both in the schools of journalism12 and law.'
3
In 1982, the ability to cover publicity-seeking crime and broadcast it
quickly and to large numbers of people was only in its infancy. Electronic
news gathering ("ENG") 4 had only just begun' 5 Satellite broadcasting
technology, enabling broadcasts from a distance, had only been developed in
1962,16 the United States had only placed its first true geostationary satellite
9. See Appendix A, infra.
10. The major forum for self-appraisal was a myriad of meetings of journalistic
organizations and associations during 1977. For a discussion of these panels and meetings,
see Herbert A. Terry, Television and Terrorism: Professionalism Not Quite the Answer, 53
IND. L.J. 745, 756-57 (1978). It is believed that the major impetus for the introspection was
an incident in 1977 in Indianapolis, Indiana, wherein Tony Kiritsis took a banker hostage for
sixty-three hours, while making calls to a radio talk show host who broadcast everything he
said on the air. He then stood outside with the hostage, a sawed-off shotgun wired to shoot
him in the head, while making an emotional speech on live television.
11. See, e.g., What's Right, Wrong with Television News, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Mar. 16, 1981 at 45 (Interview with Walter Cronkite) [hereinafter Right, Wrong].
12. See, e.g., Charles Fenyvesi, Looking Into the Muzzle of Terrorists, QUILL, Jul.-Aug.
1977, at 16 (stating that competitiveness within the industry had placed the lives of hostages
in undue danger); Mark Monday, What's Wrong With Our Aim, QUILL, Jul.-Aug. 1977, at 19
(explaining journalists should be better trained to understand and cover terrorists); Halina
Czemiejewski, Guidelines for the Coverage of Terrorism, QUILL, Jul.-Aug. 1977, at 21
(noting that formal guidelines and a more thoughtful study of the problem are needed).
13. For example, in 1978, again in response to the Kiritsis hostage-taking situation, the
Indiana School of Law published a symposium issue dedicated to the issue of media coverage
of publicity-seeking crimes. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 10, at 756-57; Walter B. Jaehnig,
Journalists and Terrorism: Captives of the Libertarian Tradition, 53 IND. L.J. 717, 720
(1978); Jordan J. Paust, International Law and Control of the Media: Terror, Repression and
the Alternatives, 53 IND. L.J. 621 (1978).
14. ENG is the use of electronic means for news coverage and transmission in place of
using film as an intermediate step. Nielsen Media, Glossary of Media Terms-E Page,
http://www.nielsenmedia.com/glossary/terms/E/E.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
15. See Wysong Enterprises, Inc., Electronic News Gathering,
http://www.wysongusa.com/electronicnewsgathering.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
ENG originally referred to the use of point-to-point terrestrial microwave signals to backhaul
the remote signal to the studio. In modem news operations, however, it also includes satellite
news gathering (SNG) and digital satellite news gathering (DSNG). ENG is almost always
done using a specially modified truck or van. Terrestrial microwave vehicles can usually be
identified by their masts which can be extended up to fifty feet (fifteen meters) in the air (to
allow line-of-sight with the station's receiver antennas), while satellite trucks always use a
larger dish that unfolds and points skywards toward one of the geostationary communications
satellites.
16. Pacific Satellite, Satellite History, http://www.pacificsatellite.com/project2.php
(last visited Apr. 16, 2008) (non-stationary satellite Telstar); Daniel L. Brenner et al., History
of Satellite Communications - The First Satellites, 2 CABLE TV § 14:2 (2008).
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in space in 1974 '7 and by 1979, the United States had only three
geostationary satellites in space.'8 Cable television was a recent invention
with few people having access to it.' 9 Mobile phones had only just been
introduced to journalism in the 1980s, 20 and did not contain texting or
imaging capabilities as they do today. Digital cameras were not created until
the late 1990S.21 The Internet was in its infancy, 22 the IBM personal
computer having only been created in 198 1.23 The first twenty-four hour
17. EDinformatics, Communications Satellite,
http://www.edinformatics.com/inventionsinventors/communicationsatellite.htm (last
visited Apr. 16, 2008); Satellite Industry Association, Satellites History,
http://www.sia.org/history.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2008) (referring to Weststar).
18. See David J. Whalen, Communications Satellites: Making the Global Village
Possible, NASA History Division,
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/satcomhistory.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2008)
(Satcom I was launched in 1975). Television began using satellites on March 1, 1978 when
the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) introduced Public Television Satellite Service.
Broadcast networks adopted satellite communication as a distribution method from 1978
through 1984. Federal Communications Commission, History of Satellite TV,
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/kidszone/history_sattv.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
19. In 1980, only fifteen million people had access to cable, and they were typically in
rural communities receiving local broadcasts. See Cable NJ,
http://www.cablenj.org/AboutUs/CableHistory.asp (demonstrating advancements in cable)
(last visited Mar. 23, 2008). By 1989, fifty-nine million people had access. By 1995, there
were 139 different cable channels available. Id. By the late 1980s, ninety-eight percent of all
homes in the U.S. had at least one television set. See EDinformatics,
http://edinformatics.com/inventionsinventors/television.htm (exploring the history of
various media outlets) (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). Today, eighty-five percent of all U.S.
households have cable, satellite or some other form of multi-channel reception. See Ted
Hearn, Analog Cutoff is Panned on Hill, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Sept. 30, 2002,
http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA246911 
.html.
20. See Collette Snowden & Kerry Green, Media Reporting, Mobility and Trauma, 10
MEDIA/CULTURE 1, Mar. 2007, available at
http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0703/04-snowden-green.php.
21. Id.
22. Internet Protocol ("IP") and Transmission Control Protocol ("TCP") were introduced
in 1981 creating the TCP/IP protocol that much of the Internet uses today. Today, 1.173
billion people in the world use the Internet (approximately eighteen percent): approximately
seventy percent of Americans, twelve percent of people in Asia, forty percent in Europe, and
fifty-five percent in Australia. See Internet World Stats: World Internet Users,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). Use of the Internet
in the United States grew 225% between 2000 and 2007. More amazing is that use of the
Internet increased 645% in Africa (3.6% use it), 495% in the Middle East (10.1% use it) and
509% in Latin America (19.8% use it). See Internet World Stats: Internet Usage Statistics for
the Americas, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats2.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
23. See IBM, IBM Personal Computer: Before the Beginning: Ancestors of the IBM
Personal Computer, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/exhibits/pc/pc_l.html (last visited
Apr. 16, 2008).
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news channel, Cable News Network ("CNN"), was only launched in 1980.24
Of course, today, all major media outlets have websites.
Since 1982, there have been at least 522 documented incidents of
non-state sponsored terrorism throughout the world, 25 thirty-seven on
American soil or targeting American citizens or assets. 26 Today,
publicity-seeking criminals-such as Osama Bin Laden,27 the Virginia Tech
shooter, Seung-Hui Cho, 28 and Jack McClellan 2 9-unabashedly use the
media to carry their message directly to the world.
Since 1982, the lower federal courts in the United States have dealt
with the balance between media and the First Amendment in only limited
ways. They have dealt with the reporter's privilege and found it insufficient
to block the government's access to phone records relevant to funding of
terrorism 30 or defendants' access to videotaped interviews of terrorists,3
they have restricted media coverage of deportation proceedings where
terrorism is involved,32 and they have found no right of the media to imbed a
24. See The History of Branding, History of CNN,
http://www.historyofbranding.com/cnn.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2008). Today, there are
five 24-hour news channels on cable in the United States: CNN, Headline News, Fox News
Channel, MSNBC, and CNBC, as well as some regional channels. See Diane Ainsworth, 25
Hour News Through the Looking Glass, BERKELEYAN, Jul. 12, 2000,
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/berkeleyan/2000/0 7 /12/news.html.
25. See Appendix B, infra.
26. Additionally, according to Mark Potok, Director of the Intelligence Project at the
Southern Poverty Law Center, law enforcement officials have foiled sixty domestic terror
plots since the Oklahoma City bombing and the number of hate groups has risen thirty-three
percent since 2000 with 803 hate groups in existence in 2005. See Tim Talley, Experts Fear
Oklahoma City Bombing Lessons Forgotten, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Apr. 17, 2006.
27. See, e.g., Bin Laden Video Finally Makes Militant Websites, http://www.usatoday.
com/news/world/2007-0908-bin-laden-videoN.htm?csp= 34 (last visited Mar. 23, 2008)
(regarding purposeful release of Bin Laden tape to news outlets before releasing it on the
Internet).
28. See What We Know, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18185859/ (last visited Mar. 23,
2008) (detailing the package of correspondence express-mailed to NBC News during the two
hours between the first and second shootings by Cho).
29. Jack McClellan is the self-admitted pedophile who ran a Web site with pictures of
children and tips for other pedophiles. Fox News and others gave him an interview due to a
Seattle newspaper report that Fox picked up on. See Katherine Noyes, Judge Slaps
Publicity-Seeking Pedophile With Restraining Order, TECH NEWS WORLD, Aug. 6, 2007,
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/58695.html.
30. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006).
31. See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
32. See N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002); Detroit Free
Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mich. 2002), affid, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002);
Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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journalist with the troops.33 They have also dealt with civil claims against
media alleging that the media outlet aided and abetted crime34 or negligently
caused harm to another person.35 The United States Supreme Court has
remained silent. The more interesting legal developments have been in the
international arena with the United Nations36 and the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 37 passing
resolutions that affect media coverage of terrorism and with three cases in
international courts that affected media coverage of terrorism. 3
Very little has been published on media coverage of terrorism or
publicity-seeking crime in the mainstream law journals or in books.39 Most
33. Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
34. See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enter., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (murder victim's family
sued publisher of "hit man instruction manual" for aiding and abetting murder and won);
Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (11 th Cir. 1992) ($4 million
verdict to two brothers for murder of father).
35. See, e.g., Clift v. Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805 (R-I. 1996) (suicide
victim's family sued television station for interview of family member during police standoff
for allegedly negligently contributing to his suicide); Risenhoover v. England, 936 F. Supp.
392 (W.D. Tex. 1996) (families of ATF agents killed during the Branch Davidian/David
Koresh search/arrest warrant execution allowed to sue newspaper and television stations
which allegedly informed the Davidians pre-raid); Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W. 2d
251 (Mo. App. 1982); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (denying negligence cause of
action against newspaper for releasing name of rape victim legally obtained as violative of
First Amendment).
36. See G.A. Res. 51/210, paras. I(3)(c), 1(4), U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996).
37. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950,213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 10 on 7, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click
on 'Basic Texts,' then click on 'English') (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
38. See Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. 27, paras. 19-21, 25 (1994), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp 197/view.asp?item= 1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=-jersild%2 0% 7 C%20v.%20%7C%20denmark&sessionid=6392234&skin=hudoc-en
(interviews of racist people broadcasted on Danish radio; broadcaster found guilty of aiding
and abetting a hate crime; European Court of Human Rights found conviction to be a violation
of Art. 10); Arslan v. Turkey, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 285-87, 30 (1999), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkpi 97/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB861
42BF01C 166DEA398649&key=852&sessionld=5836078&skin=hudocen&attachment-tr
ue (author of book convicted of publishing separatist propaganda based on racial
considerations; Court found punishment was disproportionate to aims pursued and not
necessary in democratic society); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T,
Judgment, paras. 8-10, 945 (Dec. 3, 2003) (radio station and newspaper owners convicted of
intentionally aiding and abetting hate crimes through broadcasts/publications).
39. See, e.g., Daniel Joyce, The Judith Miller Case and the Relationship Between
Reporter and Source: Competing Visions of the Media's Roll and Function, 17 FoRDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 555 (2007); Jane E. Kirtley, Transparency and
Accountability In A Time of Terror: The Bush Administration's Assault on Freedom of
Information, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 479 (2006); Todd M. Gardella, Beyond Terrorism: The
Potential Chilling Effect on the Internet of Broad Law Enforcement Legislation, 80 ST.
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of what has been published has been on the Freedom of Information Act.
Interestingly, like this initial piece, most of what has been published on the
media's connection to terrorism is student-authored.4
In 1982, could we have imagined that a terrorist such as Osama Bin
Laden would directly use the media to spread his message of terror around
the world? In the balance of American constitutional rights and freedoms, is
this the outcome desired? Why did the scholarly debate on this issue stop in
the 1980s? Hopefully, this Article might serve as a catalyst to stimulate other
scholars-in both the legal and journalistic fields-to reconsider this very
serious issue.
II. INTRODUCTION
"Terrorism" is a word which conjures up images of guerillas, foreign
nationalists, and government overthrow. However, the term encompasses far
more41 and for the purposes of this discussion includes all violence aimed at
JoHN'S L. REv. 655 (2006); Recent Cases: International Law: Genocide: UN, Tribunal Finds
That Mass Media Hate Speech Constitutes Genocide, Incitement to Genocide, and Crimes
Against Humanity - Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, 117 HARv. L. REV.
2769 (2004); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack. The Public's Right to Know and the War
On Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35 (2005); Peter Margulies, The Clear and Present
Internet: Terrorism, Cyberspace, and the First Amendment, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH 4
(2004); Carlos A. Kelly, The Pen is Mightier Than the Sword or Why the Media Should
Exercise Self-Restraint in Time of War, 77 FLA. B.J. 22 (2003); Vivien Toomey Montz,
Recent Incitement Claims Against Publishers & Filmmakers: Restraints on First Amendment
Rights or Proper Limits on Violent Speech?, 1 VA. SPORTS & ENTER. L.J. 171 (2002); Sandra
Davidson, Blood Money: When Media Expose Others To Risk of Bodily Harm, 19 HASTINGS
COMM/ENT. L.J. 225 (1997). Examples of books would include: BRIGITTE L. NAcos,
MASS-MEDIATED TERRORISM: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN TERRORISM &
COUNTERTERRORISM (2007); TERRORISM, WAR, AND THE PRESS (Nancy Palmer ed., 2003);
BRIGIrE L. NACOS, TERRORISM & THE MEDIA (1994); Todd Fraley, MEDIA TERRORISM &
THEORY: A READER (2006); WILLIAM A. HACHTEN & JAMES F. SCOTTON, THE WORLD NEWS
PRISM: GLOBAL MEDIA IN AN ERA OF TERRORISM (2002); FRAMING TERRORISM: THE NEWS
MEDIA, THE GOVERNMENT, & THE PUBLIC (Pippa Norris et al. eds., 2003).
40. See, e.g., Spencer W. Davis, Note, Incitement to Terrorism in Media Coverage:
Solutions to Al-Jazeera After the Rwandan Media Trial, 38 GEO. WASH. INTL. L. REv. 749
(2006); Benjamin R. Davis, Comment, Ending the Cyber Jihad: Combating Terrorist
Exploitation of the Internet with the Rule of Law and Improved Tools for Cyber Governance,
15 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 119 (2006); David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National
Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005); Elana J. Zeide,
Note, In Bed With the Military: First Amendment Implications of Embedded Journalism, 80
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1309 (2005); Nick Suplina, Note, Crowd Control: The Troubling Mix of First
Amendment Law, Political Demonstrations, and Terrorism, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 395
(2005).
41. There is no generally accepted definition of terrorism. A common thread found in
most definitions is the objective to receive the widest dissemination possible of the message,
act, or identity of the perpetrators. See Research Study, International and Transnational
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influencing the attitude and behavior of one or more target audiences, or, to
42coin a term, publicity-seeking crimes. In the past decade, the number of
publicity-seeking crimes has escalated to a point where thousands of lives, 43
forty-two per cent of them American, 44 are taken each year and whole
societies are held captive by one or more misguided individuals.
One of the problems of combating incidences of publicity-seeking
crime is media involvement. Violence or threats of violence have long been
deemed "newsworthy"45 items by the media. Publicity-seeking criminals
have recognized this fact and put it to full use. By attacking highly visible
targets in a dramatic manner, publicity-seeking criminals guarantee
themselves saturated news coverage. They make a shocking appeal to
traditional news values by making full use of the news industry's attraction
to the dramatic, conflict-laden, and potentially tragic event. The media thus
Terrorism. Diagnosis and Prognosis, 7-8 (CIA Apr. 1976) [hereinafter Research Study]; Dan
van der Vat, Terrorism and the Media, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Apr. 1982, at 25; LEGAL &
OTHER ASPECTS OF TERRORISM at 183 (E. Nobles Lowe et al. eds., 1979); M. CHERF
BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES at xi (1975). However, some
criminal acts which would be labeled terrorism by many do not seek publicity. For example,
state-sponsored terrorism, i.e. genocide, hopes to gain no publicity. See M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and the Mass Media: Perspectives, Problems, Proposals, 72 J.
CRim. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2, 7 (1981) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Perspectives]. See also,
generally, Paust, supra note 13. Also, some criminal acts which seek publicity would not
meet the criteria of some definitions of terrorism. Most definitions of terrorism require the
objective of instilling fear in a targeted person or group of persons. Persons committing
violent crimes just for self-glorification will not fit this element of many definitions.
42. A wide variety of crimes could be committed in seeking publicity but the most common
are: kidnapping (with threat of bodily harm), barricading hostages, bombings (letter,
incendiary, and explosive), hijacking, assassination and sniping. See NATIONAL FOREIGN
ASSESSMENT CENTER, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN 1978, at 4 (Fig. 5) (Mar. 1979)
[hereinafter CIA REPORT].
43. In 1968-1971, deaths from terrorist activities averaged 60 per year and injuries
averaged 200 per year. By 1978, death and injuries were up to 450 and 400 respectively. See
id. at ii. By 1980, deaths were at 1,173. See As Violence Spreads: Is U.S. Next?, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT at 32, 33 (Sept. 14, 198 1) [hereinafter Violence Spreads].
44. The most active arenas for publicity-seeking crimes are North America, West
Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. Together they account for approximately 90% of
all such activity. North America is the site of approximately 9.7% of the incidents while the
U.S.S.R. and socialist Eastern Europe account for only 0.4% of terrorism. See CIA REPORT
supra note 42, at 2, 7. Only 9.7% of the incidents take place in America-a fact which is
explained by geographic inconvenience, bureaucratic obstacles, familiarity and attitude
toward America. See Violence Spreads, supra note 43, at 33. Despite this statistic, Americans
abroad are the most prominent targets of terrorism; 41.9% of the total casualties are American
nationals. See CIA REPORT supra note 42, at 4 (Fig. 5).
45. Deciding just what "newsworthy material" is may be an unattainable goal. The line
between news and entertainment is becoming thinner and thinner. See, e.g., discussion infra
at notes 71-75.
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furthers the criminals' objectives by publicizing an incident that was staged
for the very purpose of obtaining media coverage. This has come to be
called by many a "symbiotic relationship. 46
Critics both within47 and outside4 8 the news industry have begun to
voice an awareness, if not a concern, for the ease with which such criminals
obtain publicity on both a national and international platform. And yet, since
1977, when most of the self-appraisal and outside criticism dramatically
increased,49 no real changes have been made. Although a number of
self-regulating guidelines have been promulgated by various broadcasting
organizations, ° it has been the general consensus that the First Amendment
46. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 42, at 14; Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 720.
47. See discussion supra at notes 10-12.
48. See, e.g., Fenyvesi, supra note 12, at 16 (explaining that competitiveness within the
industry had placed the lives of hostages in undue danger); Monday, supra note 12, at 19
(journalists should be better trained to understand and cover terrorists); Czemiejewski, supra
note 12, at 21 (arguing that formal guidelines and a more thoughtful study of the problem
needed). The major forum for self appraisal, though, was the myriad of meetings of
journalistic organizations and associations during 1977. For a discussion of these panels and
meetings, see Terry, supra note 10, at 756-57.
49. 1977 saw a dramatic jump in the number of terrorist incidents, especially in America.
However, the most likely cause for the critical attention given the problem that year was the
manipulation of the media by theretofore unknown Anthony Kiritsis to gain live news
coverage to express his personal grievances while holding a gun to the head of his hostage.
See Terry, supra note 10, at 750-52; Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 717-18 for details of the event.
Coincidentally, by 1977, seventy-five percent of commercial television broadcast stations had
three new pieces of equipment, just invented in 1973, referred to as ENG equipment. They
include: small, light video cameras (minicams), light, battery-powered video recorders, and
the real technological breakthrough, a device called the time-base connector which converts
the output of the lightweight video tape recorders into a picture with sufficient stability to be
broadcast. These three pieces of equipment for the first time allowed instantaneous
on-the-spot coverage of the news. See Terry, supra note 10, at 749.
50. The following guidelines, included as a part of the CBS News Standards, became the
model for most other guidelines that various news organizations adopted:
An essential component of the story is the demands of the terrorist/kidnapper and
we must report those demands. But we should avoid providing an excessive
platform for the terrorist/kidnapper. Thus, unless such demands are succinctly
stated and free of rhetoric and propaganda, it may be better to paraphrase the
demands instead of presenting them directly through the voice or picture of the
terrorist/kidnapper.
Except in the most compelling circumstances, and then only with the approval of
the President of CBS News or in his absence, the Senior Vice President of News,
there should be no live coverage of the terrorist/kidnapper since we may fall into the
trap of providing an unedited platform for him. (This does not limit live on-the-spot
reporting by CBS News reporters, but care should be exercised to assure restraint
and context.)
News personel [sic] should be mindful of the probable need by the authorities who
are dealing with the terrorist for communication by telephone and hence should
endeavor to ascertain, wherever feasible, whether our own use of such lines would
Number 3]
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bars any government regulation in this area. It is the thesis of this Article that
this may not be true in all cases. An analysis of the First Amendment as it
applies to various forms of government regulation will follow the discussion
of the problems created by publicity-seeking crimes and the media coverage
thereof.
III. THE PROBLEM OF MEDIA COVERAGE OF PUBLICITY-SEEKING
CRIMES
The objectives of terrorists, other than seeking publicity, are often
coercion, extortion, disorientation and despair, provocation of unpopular
countermeasures, and (with regard to the terrorists themselves)
morale-building.5' M. Cherif Bassiouni, a leading scholar on international
terrorism, has identified four types of publicity-seeking criminals based on
their motivation: (1) the common criminal motivated by personal gain; (2)
the person acting as a consequence of a psychopathic condition; (3) the
person seeking to publicize a claim or redress an individual grievance; and
(4) the ideologically motivated individual.52 This last category of individual
is the one most frequently associated with the term "terrorism." It has been
53noted, however, at least in the area of assassination, that the emphasis may
be likely to interfere with the authorities' communications.
Responsible CBS News representatives should endeavor to contact experts dealing
with the hostage situation to determine whether they have any guidance on such
questions as phraseology to be avoided, what kinds of questions or reports might
tend exacerbate the situation, etc. Any recommendations by established authorities
on the scene should be carefully considered as guidance (but not as instruction) by
CBS News personnel.
Local authorities should also be given the name or names of CBS personnel whom
they can contact should they have further guidance or wish to deal with such
delicate questions as a newsman's call to the terrorists or other matters which might
interfere with authorities dealing with the terrorist.
Guidelines affecting our coverage of civil disturbances are also applicable here,
especially those which relate to avoiding the use of inflammatory catchwords or
phrases, the reporting of rumors, etc. As in the case of policy dealing with civil
disturbances, in dealing with a hostage story reporters should obey all police
instructions but report immediately to their superiors any such instructions that
seem to be intended to manage or suppress the news.
Coverage of this kind of story should be in such overall balance as to length that it
does not unduly crowd out other important news of the hour/day.
Terry, supra note 10, at 776-77.
51. See Research Study, supra note 41, at 8. See also, Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra
note 41, at 32, n.124 for a list of thirteen strategic objectives of terrorists that media coverage
may help to fulfill.
52. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra 41, at 8.
53. See Richard Restak, Assassin!, 89 SCIENCE DIGEST 78, 82 (1981).
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be shifting to individuals seeking self-definition 4 or self-assertion.
William R. Catton, professor of sociology at Washington University,
observes that although
some of the groups so desperate for publicity want it as a
presumed means of attaining political, economic, or nationalistic
goals [(instrumentally - oriented terrorists)] ... [others] appear to
crave publicity for its own sake [(expressly-oriented terrorists)] -
i.e., as an antidote to the ignominy of seeming superfluous in a
world too vast to have otherwise noticed their existence. 6
If nothing else, commentators seem to agree on one thing: to these people,
more conventional means of communication seem to be unavailable or
ineffective. 7
Scattered, isolated incidents of violence by themselves are of little use
to publicity-seekers in producing their objectives of fear, coercion, and
publication of a cause or self-identification. Terrorists rely on the
psychological impact of acts rather than their immediate destructive
consequences.58 To achieve such impact, publicity-seeking criminals need
to publicize their acts as widely as possible. Since the mass media have the
ability to confer importance upon an individual or an event merely by
presenting it,59 they play a major role in the spreading and intensification of
the desired psychological impact. With the advent of increasing numbers of
technological communicative advances, 60 publicity-seeking criminals are
able to command the immediate attention of millions, enabling these
criminals to work their felonious will on whole nations rather than just the
hostages in their presence.61
The media has been described as "a powerful force, sometimes more
influential than government itself.' 62 In fact, Iranian Acting Foreign
Minister Abol Hassan Banisadr, during the taking of American hostages
from the U.S. Embassy in Iran, exemplified this attitude when he said,
54. Id.
55. See William R. Catton, Jr., Militants and the Media: Partners in Terrorism?, 53 IND.
L.J. 703, 707 (1978).
56. Id. at 710.
57. Id. at 705; Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 15; Restak, supra note 53, at
82-83.
58. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 8.
59. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Televised Violence: First
Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REv. 1123, 1134 (1978).
60. See Terry, supra note 10, at 749; Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 14;
Research Study, supra note 41, at 2, 19.
61. Catton, supra note 55, at 704.
62. See Legal & Other Aspects of Terrorism, supra note 41, at 183.
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"Diplomats cannot solve this problem. We want to solve it through
'newspaper diplomacy."'' 63 This influence through the media could be a
good thing if only the actions necessary to get this attention and
consequential influence could fall short of violence.
Unfortunately, this has not been the case. William Raspberry, a
columnist for the Washington Post, lamented on the use of violence as a
means of gaining needed attention in the Watts Riots of 1965. 64 He pointed
out that the attention received during the violent riots that summer brought
home to the black people and other poor people that they could command the
attention of the press. They realized that riots, threats of disorder, or
demonstrations that had the prospect of getting out of hand always got the
press out there. They found, for the first time, that this attention could lead to
some positive gains for them and that was one of the reasons rioting
flourished.65
Why, then, must violence be resorted to in order to gain the "needed
attention"? Is it just an example of the age-old maxim, "The wheel that
squeaks the loudest is the one that gets the grease?" 66 Or, is there more to it?
American mass media--electronic (television and radio) and print
(newspaper and magazine)-are commercial enterprises just as any other
business. They exist and thrive by making profits. Profits are obtained from
selling time or space to advertisers at rates determined by circulation or
audience size.67 The larger the audience, the more each medium prospers.
The availability of attention-getting content serves the audience-attracting
needs of the industry.68 The dramatic, often emotional events staged by
publicity-seeking criminals make news, sell newspapers, and draw millions
to the television set. This adds handsomely to the profits of media owners,
advertisers, shareholders, and employees (and no doubt to the job security of
the journalists covering the event)69 and contributes to the overall "success"
news reporting has seen in recent years.70
63. Tehran's Reluctant Diplomats, TIME, Dec. 3, 1979 at 64.
64. Raspberry also points out that when the riots began, reporters for the L.A. Times could
not find a single clip on Watts in their newspaper's morgue and that big city newspapers
everywhere suddenly became painfully aware that they knew nothing about their own ghettos.
See Pohlmann & Foley, supra note 1, at 34.
65. Id.
66. Attributed to Josh Billings, American humorist (1818-1885).
67. Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 25.
68. Catton, supra note 55, at 713.
69. See van der Vat, supra note 41, at 25.
70. Catton, supra note 55, at 713.
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The supposition that "news" is becoming a more popular form of
television "entertainment" is illustrated by such articles as The Coming
Explosion in TVNews. 71 Television tops all media in the number of people
relying on it as their primary news source.72 Urban stations are doubling and
tripling the time they devote to news and nonfiction features. 73 Cable
networks have already created one 24-hour news channel and are working on
two more.74 In fact, a former news chief at CBS predicts that news will soon
become the prime staple of the American viewing public. 75 As the line
between "news" and "entertainment" grows less and less visible, and as the
commercial objectives of news carriers become more and more evident,
publicity-seeking criminals can be expected to continue, if not escalate, their
efforts to feed on this audience-attracting need.
In fact, according to a 1979 CIA report,76 the nature and intensity of
publicity-seeking crimes will fluctuate widely in the future. The
composition and character of such crimes will continue to change and
78increase in number although the regional patterns will stay the same.
According to the CIA, representatives of affluent countries, particularly
government officials and business executives, will continue to be the
primary targets for assassinations and kidnappings although the majority of
incidents will continue to be bombings and incendiary attacks. 79 The CIA
does voice a concern-as do others worried with nuclear development 8° -
that overcoming present tactical and technological limitations may permit




74. Id. See also Right, Wrong, supra note 11, at 45.
75. See The Coming Explosion in TV News, supra note 71, at 45.




80. See Catton, supra note 55, at 704. But see, Violence Spreads, supra note 43, at 34.
Mr. Jenkins feels that because terrorists are not bent on killing large numbers of people,
because they fear that resorting to nuclear terrorism might alienate constituents, because
nuclear terrorism could provoke public revulsion and because terrorists fear an unprecedented
governmental crackdown, any suggestion of mass killing would probably not succeed. But see
United States v. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (E.D. Wis. 1979), where a lower federal court
considered the potential for such nuclear destruction to outweigh any First Amendment rights.
"A mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for thermonuclear
annihilation for us all. In that event, our right to life is extinguished and the right to publish
becomes moot." Id. at 996.
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use of more sophisticated devices such as heat-seeking missiles and the
like.8'
The trend, as shown by the previous incident and death statistics, 82 is
on a dramatic incline. Professor Catton believes that, in addition to feeling
significance deprivation, 3 all people, especially Americans, are losing faith
that any shortcomings of the present can be rectified in the future. 84 The
combined effect of these feelings of insignificance, frustration with the
system, and incompetence could lead to an increase in American-based
expressly oriented acts. Brian Jenkins, director of the RAND Corporation
program on political violence agrees. 5 He feels that although the American
political system has an enormous co-optive capacity, 86 some "engines of
terrorism ' '87 that did not exist in America in the past could be emerging. He
pointed to the peoples' perception of the economy and the development of
single-issue politics as examples. 88 These changing societal factors
combined with the high rate of relative success achieved8 9 and the continued
media saturation coverage9" indicate little hope of de-escalation.
81. See CIA REPORT, supra note 42, at 1, 5.
82. See Violence Spreads, supra note 43.
83. See supra note 54-59.
84. See Catton, supra note 52, at 708.
85. See Violence Spreads, supra note 43.
86. By "co-optive," Mr. Jenkins means that the American political system can
"incorporate an enormous diversity within its political system." See id. at 33.
87. Id.
88. Id. Mr. Jenkins contrasts "single-issue politics" against an overall anti-capitalist or
nihilistic philosophy. He observed that we have already seen some willingness among
single-issue movements to break the law but noted that it was not to the extent of doing
serious violence to people or property. However, in November 1982, this point may have been
reached when an anti-nuclear power advocate held the Washington Monument and its
occupants hostage.
89. Terrorists have met with a high degree of success in accomplishing their objectives.
In a study of sixty-three major kidnapping and barricade operations executed between early
1968 and late 1974, the RAND Corporation concluded that such actions were subject to the
following probabilities of risk and success:
87% probability of actually seizing hostages
79% chance that all members of the terrorist team will escape punishment or death,
whether or not they successfully seized hostages
40% chance that all or some demands will be met in operations where something
more than just safe passage or exit permission was demanded.
29% chance of complete compliance with such demands
83% chance of success where safe passage or exit, for the terrorist themselves or for
others, was the sole demand
67% chance that, if concessions to the principal demands were rejected, all or
virtually all members of the terrorist team could still escape alive by going
underground, accepting safe passage in lieu of original demands, or surrendering to
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What if this situation continues to exist? What are the consequences?
Professor Bassouini has determined four main effects of media
coverage of publicity-seeking crimes: intimidation, imitation, immunization,
and imperilization. Media coverage of publicity-seeking crimes often (1)
enhances the environment of fear and coercion the terrorists seek to generate
(intimidation factor); (2) encourages other individuals to engage in such
conduct (imitation factor); (3) dulls the sense of outrage and contempt in the
general public (immunization factor); and (4) endangers hostages' lives and
interferes with effective law enforcement (imperilization factor).9'
A. Intimidation
Considered alone, each publicity-seeking act is not nearly as ominous
as it appears to be. More than twice the number of people who have died in
terrorist incidents between 1968 and 1975 have died from asthma in a single
year in the U.S.; ten times as many have died from influenza. 92 By focusing
on terrorist events and giving them a disproportionate amount of news
coverage, the media engenders the feeling in the viewing public that such
events are more common and, therefore, more dangerous than they really
are.93 Media, particularly television, gives the effect of authenticity per se.
94
It gives the criminal the auspices of power in a short time, with little effort,
on a wide scale. In some respects, the modem "terrorist" is "created" by the
media: they magnify and enlarge him and his powers far beyond its true
magnitude. 95 In effect, television puts everyone at the scene of the crime,
helpless to do anything, engendering feelings of anxiety and fear-the
terrorist's instruments of coercion. This public anxiety enhances the
perceived power of the terrorist in his own eyes as well as the eyes of his peer
group and others.96 This enhanced power often leads to imitation97 and the
cycle repeats itself.
a sympathetic government, and
100% probability of gaining major publicity whenever that was one of the
terrorist's goals.
Research Study, supra note 39, at 22.
90. See The Coming Explosion in TV News, supra note 75, at 45.
91. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 18-19.
92. See Catton, supra note 55, at 712.
93. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 3.
94. Id. at21.
95. See National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards & Goals, REPORT
OF THE TASK FORCE ON DISORDERS & TERRORISM 366 (1976) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
96. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 22.
97. See id. at 18-19.
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B. Imitation
According to leading sociologists, "among all the different ways one
might behave in given circumstances, any particular way is more likely to be
repeated when the circumstances recur if the previous time it was done it was
followed by some gratifying experience." 98 This is referred to as the
"operant conditioning model." 99 This can also occur as a result of vicarious
reinforcement through observational learning.100 In other words,
If a person observes another individual, with whom he more or
less identifies, and sees that in certain circumstances a certain
action by that other individual tends to be followed by an
experience that is rewarding to that other person, the probability
that the observer would behave in those circumstances in about
the way the observed person did is enhanced.'01
Therefore, if a would-be terrorist sees someone else's terror-inspiring act
succeeding (i.e., resulting in a gratifying experience) then the probability
that the would-be terrorist will engage in similar acts is increased. If
publicity is what these individuals seek, then receiving such publicity is
gratifying and rewarding. By providing such a "reward" to publicity-seeking
criminals, media is reinforcing and encouraging present and future
terrorists. 102 An excellent example of such a phenomenon took place during
the Iran crisis. 10 3 Shortly after the incident began, United States' Embassies
were attacked in Bangladesh, Libya, and Pakistan, basically following the
steps of the successful Iranians.'14
Of course, the information on operant conditioning and vicarious
reinforcement is theoretical and data on such social phenomenon will never
be clear enough to convince all social scientists and all legal scholars. But, to
quote former Surgeon General Jesse Steinfield, "There comes a time when
98. See Catton, supra note 55, at 713.
99. See Gerwitz,. Mechanism of Social Learning: Some Roles of Stimulation and
Behavior in Early Human Development, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND
RESEARCH 57-212 (D. Goslin ed. 1969). See also Catton, supra note 55, at 713. Professor
Bassiouni terms this phenomenon a "psychological projection prediction syndrome."
100. See Albert Bandura, Social-Learning Theory of Identificatory Processes, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 213-62 (D. Goslin, ed. 1969). See
also Catton, supra note 55, at 714.
101. Catton, supra note 55, at 714.
102. Id.
103. See Tehran's Reluctant Diplomats, supra note 65.
104. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 26.
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data are sufficient to justify action."'10 5 There is a strong argument that the
time is now. Ninety-three per cent of police chiefs surveyed in a recent study
felt like live television coverage of terrorist acts encouraged terrorism.
106
Sixty-four percent of the general public surveyed in a 1977 Gallup poll
believed detailed news coverage of terrorism encourages others to commit
similar crimes. 10 7 It is also suggested that terrorist groups conform to certain
media stereotypes in their internal organizational structure, chain of
command, choice of targets, time, place, and manner of action, and even in
the attitudes of their members.
10 8
Professor Catton warns, though, that the distinction must be made
between "instrumentally-oriented terrorists" and "expressly-oriented
terrorists."' 1 9 For instrumentally-oriented terrorists, publicity about their
goals would be reinforcing, but publicity about their actions and not their
goals would not be reinforcing. For expressly-oriented terrorists, any
publicity-even negative publicity-would be reinforcing. They seek
publicity for its own sake, for self-identification. Any media attention
provides relief from their "significance deprivation."" 0
C. Immunization
Constant and detailed coverage of publicity-seeking crimes has three
less immediate and perhaps more subtle effects on society. First, it increases
the level of public tolerance of such crimes and lessens the feeling of
righteous indignation."' This, one might argue, is good because it thwarts
the terrorist's goal of intimidation by removing the shock factor."12 On the
105. Surgeon General's Report to the Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and
Social Behavior: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 25-26 (1972).
106. M. Sommer, Project on Television Coverage of Terrorism, reported in EDITOR &
PUBLISHER, Aug.27, 1977, at 12.
107. Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 721. See also, Hendrick, When Television is a School for
Criminals, TV GUIDE, Jan. 29, 1977, at 4. After interviewing inmates at a Michigan prison,
Hendrick reported that ninety percent of the inmates admitted that had "learned new tricks
and improved their criminal expertise by watching crime programs." Forty percent said they
had attempted crimes they had viewed on television. Id. at 5.
108. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 18.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 714.
111. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 22.
112. See Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, 13 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 379, 386
(July 1981); Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 22.
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other hand, more persons will feel less constricted by conscience as a result
of the lessening social opprobrium.' " 3
Second, the portrayal of all terrorists as crazies or as individuals and/or
organizations beyond society's means of control suggests to the public that
there is nothing that can be done to solve the problem. The problem is
explained away thus lessening the chance of actively seeking solutions and
thereby increasing the probability that such acts will continue unhampered.
Third, repeated coverage of terrorist events tends to conceptualize the
act. 4 Instead of seeing an individual criminal, an individual victim, or an
individual policeman, the public perceives roles-i.e., terrorists, hostages,
law enforcement agencies-being played in a huge chess game. The
individual act becomes an event and the human dimensions become lost.
D. Imperilization
Ongoing coverage of hostage-taking incidents is the hotbed of the
media coverage controversy, and yet the problems seen there are probably
the most susceptible to legal solution." 5 There are two general areas of
conflict: (1) media dissemination of information tactically useful to the
publicity-seeking criminal and (2) media interference with an effective law
enforcement response. 16
1. Media dissemination of information
Media can serve as the "intelligence arm"' 17 of the criminal in many ways.
Today, in most hostage situations, the criminal has a television or radio
device within near proximity. By broadcasting police strategies," 18 activities,
plans, or the presence of hidden persons" 9 or escaping hostages, the media
113. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 22.
114. Id.
115. See discussion infra at notes 313-331 and 349-351.
116. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 28-30.
117. Id. at 28.
118. For a discussion of the strategic, hollow immunity offer made to Anthony Kiritsis and
the planned refutation almost broadcast along with the potential ramifications of such
broadcast, see Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 717, 719-20.
119. For example, in the 1977 Hanafi Muslim takeover of three buildings and 135
hostages in Washington, D.C., television cameras filmed a basket being lifted to the fifth floor
where eleven people had evaded capture. Upon seeing this broadcast, the Hanafis tried to
break the barricaded door to this room down. A tense nine-hour ordeal ensued but the police
were finally able to free the people. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 29.
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endangers the lives of the hostages, 20 law enforcement personnel, and
innocent citizens. 12 They also assist the criminals in determining escape
routes and repelling police assaults.
22
2. Media interference with law enforcement
The physical presence of the media often interferes with the law enforcement
agencies at the scene that are trained to effectively handle such situations.
The somewhat obtrusive equipment interferes with their free movement and
attracts crowds which compound the risk and increase the burden on the
police. Questioning by a multitude of reporters can often distract key
personnel at critical moments. Direct media contact with the criminal can tie
up telephone access, incite the criminal by use of inflammatory questions or
phrases, 23 goad the criminal into action to prove himself in the spotlight, 24
and can have the effect of isolating a trained professional negotiator from the
mediating process by increasing the role of the untrained media person.
25
Police officials claim that the stampede of journalists to interview terrorists
reinforces their sense of power and accomplishment. 126 Often, the mere
presence of the media encourages terrorists to remain barricaded or to
demand a press conference so as to increase coverage.1
27
Why then, with the multitude of bad consequences, do the media
continue to grant such all-pervasive coverage to publicity-seeking criminals?
The profit motive was considered earlier. The media, though, have what they
consider more legitimate reasons for their continued coverage.
120. For example, during the 1977 hijacking of a Lufthansajet, the media broadcasted that
the pilot was passing intelligence information to the police. Upon hearing this on their radio,
the terrorists promptly executed the pilot. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 29.
121. The 1977 Sommer survey showed that seventy-nine per cent of the police chiefs
surveyed felt that live television coverage was a threat to hostages. See M. Sommer, supra
note 106, at 12.
122. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 29.
123. Those who have had experience with terrorists have discovered that one particular
word-a trigger word-can turn a seemingly normal man into an irrational and abnormal one
in an instant. See INsTITUTE FOR STUDY OF CONFLICT, TELEVISION AND CONFLICT (1978) at
19-20. For example, during the Hanafi incident, a media contact identified the Hanafi
Muslims with the Black Muslims. Khaalis, the leader of the sect, became enraged and
threatened to execute one hostage in retaliation until the reporter, following police advice,
apologized. See Fenyvesi, supra note 12, at 17.
124. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 29.
125. Id. at 29-30.
126. Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 723.
127. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 30.
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IV. THE MEDIA'S REASONING
The media defends its coverage of publicity-seeking crimes as being
part of its historical role in the makeup of American society. The freedoms of
expression and of the press are usually justified in one or more ways. 28
First, they are an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering
truth. Someone seeking knowledge and truth needs to hear all sides of a
question and to consider all alternatives. 29 Second, they are an essential
element of self-governance. The governed must, in order to exercise their
right to vote, be fully informed. 130 These first two factors are commonly
encompassed in the concept of the public's "right to know." Finally, they
operate as democracy's safety valve by substituting reason for force and
providing a framework within which the conflict necessary to the progress of
society can take place without destroying society.' 3
The media feel that in fulfilling the above objectives, it is their duty to
play the role of the uninvolved observer, 32 to merely report information. In
fact, a widely-used reporting textbook advises the student ofjournalism that
the effect of reporting the news is not the reporter's concern, 133 nor is
preventing violence or determining the legitimacy of the grievance. 134
Walter Jaehnig, a professor of journalism himself, terms this role the
"libertarian tradition. ' ' 135 Libertarianism lacks a moral code or philosophy
and promotes moral neutrality. 136 When asked if a distinction shouldn't be
made between terrorist acts and civil disobedience and the coverage keyed to
such a distinction, an editor of a major metropolitan newspaper answered
128. See Thomas I. Emerson, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-8 (1970). There
has been great debate over the years as to whether the addition of "and of the press" to the
First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech holds any special significance. It is the
general feeling today that the press clause does not signify any "special" privileges except in
very rare instances. For a discussion of the press clause, see generally, First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (Burger, J., concurring); Potter Stewart, Or of the
Press, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 631 (1975); Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction - Is Freedom of the
Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 639
(1975); David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REv. 77 (1975).
129. See Emerson, supra note 128, at 6.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Jaehnig supra note 13, at 735.
133. Curtis D. MacDougall, Interpretive Reporting 11 (1977).
134. See Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 732.
135. Id. at 739.
136. Id.
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that "...once we start making judgments of this sort ... I think the media is ...
doing something far different from its basic role of simply informing."'
37
This idea is simply not true. First, it assumes that such judgments are
not already being made. Every day, editors and news producers decide
what's "newsworthy" and what's not, how much coverage will be given,
how it will be classified, how the headline will read, who will be
interviewed, how many reporters and cameras should be sent, and so forth.
38
Second, with the instantaneous coverage permitted by the minicam, the
individual decision of where one wants to go and what one wants to see has
been taken away from the individual and put in the hands of the press. They
have become the eyes and ears of the public-a conduit, a surrogate.
39
Like it or not, the media has the responsibility of deciding for the public what
they want to experience in their lives.' 4 ' The roles of the neutral, uninvolved
observer and recorder of fact are antiquated ones if they even exist at all.
Particularly in the area of coverage of publicity-seeking crimes, journalists
today are often thrust into a life and death situation.' 4' Every reporter
covering such an event must decide whether his actions are going to be
governed by the interests of the hostages/victims, public authorities and the
community at large, or the newsgathering and financial interests of his
station or newspaper. 42 Moral neutrality provides an insufficient basis for
137. Id. at 741.
138. As Professor Catton put it, "Why have we less 'right to be alerted' by the media to
each million tons of potentially climate changing C02 added to the atmosphere, or each ton of
radioactive waste added by the electric power industry...? When did the authors of the Bill of
Rights decide it was violence committed by militants that we most needed to be informed
about?" Catton, supra note 55, at 715. See-also Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 2
n.7 where Professor Bassiouni notes the lack of coverage of state-sponsored terrorism, i.e.,
genocide in Cambodia/Vietnam, etc.
139. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1979). Instantaneous
broadcasting largely eliminates the journalistic editing function. As Robert Faw, a CBS news
reporter, once said, "[Tlhere's absolutely no journalism that takes place in a situation like that.
The reporter becomes a game show host." Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 719 n.4.
140. A distinction must be noted here. A frequent argument by television producers is that
the viewer could choose not to watch a violent or obscene show. This theory has never been
really tested in the television context in the courts but has not fared well in the radio context.
See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). It is even less viable as it applies to
television news. If the public has a right to know the day's news, they have a right to not
have to make a choice between viewing it with unnecessary violence, obscenity, etc. and not
viewing it at all.
141. A distinction has been made, also, in the coverage of publicity-seeking crimes
because the reporter, through his use by the criminal, becomes a newsmaker rather than just a
reporter of facts. See LEGAL AND OTHER ASPECTS OF TERRORISM, supra note 41, at 183.
142. See Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 724.
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such decisions. 143 Since the 1940's, it has been argued that the media's
freedom to report must be accompanied by the duty to report responsibly.' 44
Surely, responsible judgments must be made that distinguish between the
war of ideas that is fought within the legitimate boundaries of freedom of
speech and the conflicts that resort to violence and intimidation rather than
verbal expression and intellect.
An additional purpose or role of the free press, as perceived by Justice
Stewart and others, 145 is to act as an additional check on the three official
branches of government. 146 In fact, the press has come to be termed the
"Fourth Estate."'147 This, arguably, is an important role the media does play.
But the coverage of publicity-seeking crimes is not related to the functioning
of any one of our three branches of government. Even if the criminal's
purpose is to draw attention to what he considers a defect in our
governmental system, he must be made to understand that there are many
nonviolent ways for his protest to be heard within the legitimate parameters
of free speech. He has no constitutional right to express himself in violent
ways at the expense of innocent people, 48 yet the media nearly guarantee
him just such a right. In addition, there are other ways for the media to
provide him a forum for expression 149 and to inform the public about an
individual's grievances with our government in ways that do not publicize
these violent acts. 150
The media also express a concern over the possible loss of credibility in
the eyes of the public if they withhold any information. 15' They fear the
public will question what other types of information might be withheld,
143. Id. at 739.
144. See COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS(1947); FouR THEORIES OF THE PRESS (Frederick Siebert, et al., eds. 1956); Clarence J. Mann,
Personnel and Property of Transnational Corporations, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INT'L TERRORISM(ASIL 1978); Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 740, n.89.
145. Particularly the media themselves. See also, Floyd Abrams, The Press Is Different:
Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 563, 591-92
(1979).
146. Stewart, supra note 128, at 634.
147. Id. See also, LEGAL AND OTHER ASPECTS OF TERRORISM, supra note 41, at 183.
148. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 36. For a discussion of the
speech/action dichotomy, see also Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 601(1978); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72
(2d Cir. 1966).
149. See discussion infra at notes 341-346.
150. Id.
151. See 'Who's Who' Looks into the Ethical Questions of Covering Terrorist Acts,




suspect collusion with governmental agencies, and so forth. This again
assumes that the public trusts that the media present all the facts in an
unbiased way. In a recent national survey,'52 Barbara Walters, Dan Rather,
and Roger Mudd-all leading journalists-were the top three least trusted
news personalities of the year. 53 Evidently, the public does not "trust" all
journalists now. Even so, the credibility problem can be overcome in three
ways. First, if the public is told the reasons and purposes behind the limited
coverage-and legitimate reasons they are-they will understand (and
probably agree with) the suppression of some news. Second, if the media is
only responding to our working within legitimate laws regulating
coverage, 54 they can hardly be held responsible for limited coverage and
accused of collusion. Finally, a total blackout is unnecessary (if not
illegal).' 55 As argued later in this Article, 56 limited access and perhaps
restraints on publicizing life-endangering information prior to the
culmination of the event would still allow the public to stay informed and yet
alleviate some of the problems related to media coverage of such crimes.
The media also argue that they serve worthwhile and necessary
functions while covering publicity-seeking crimes in that they squelch
rumors,1 57 they can be an effective bargaining tool for the negotiator to use
to obtain release of hostages, 158 and they can provide law enforcement
agencies with otherwise unavailable tactical and intelligence information.5 9
They also argue that lack of coverage will provoke these criminals to even
more visible forms of violence which can't be ignored, 60 instill in the public
a false sense of security, 16 1 and fulfill the propaganda objective of terrorists
by illustrating that democratic states are not really free. 1
62
These are legitimate observations. It must be remembered, however,
that were the media not there to begin with, in all likelihood neither would be
the terrorists; the immediacy of rumors usually only affect the immediate
152. Our Fifth Annual Poll: The Reader's Revenge, PEOPLE, Mar. 14, 1982, at 40.
153. Id. at42.
154. See discussion infra at notes 249-253, 266-275, 281-287, 313-319.
155. See discussion infra at notes 240-280.
156. See discussion infra at notes 313-331.
157. See Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 735; LEGAL AND OTHER ASPECTS OF TERRORISM, supra
note 41, at 187; van der Vat, supra note 41, at 26; Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at
47.
158. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 31.
159. Id.
160. See van der Vat, supra note 41, at 26; Paust, supra note 13, at 671.
161. See van der Vat, supra note 41, at 26.
162. Id. See Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 24.
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area and can be dissipated with minimal coverage. In a trade-off between
giving tactical information to the terrorists which would endanger lives and
getting tactical information from the terrorists, not many would choose the
latter. 63 Also, as has been previously argued,' 64 saturation coverage has the
same effect on possible escalation in forms of violence as does lack of
coverage and media-created anxiety is "functional rather than dysfunctional"
only when it prepares individuals to confront danger realistically 165 which
current coverage doesn't do. And, again, a no-win situation is created by
the terrorist: choose your propaganda-my grievances or your purported
lack of freedom. Again, this propaganda objective is truly only fulfilled by a
total blackout which is not suggested here. Other restraints, given legitimate
and compelling purposes behind them, are justifiable.
V. SOLUTIONS
What, then, can be done? A number of suggestions have been made by
both law enforcement officials, government' 66 and the media. 67 However,
very little else has been done. These suggestions can be divided into two
basic groups: non-content-related and content-related. 168
A. Non-content-related Suggestions
The most often recommended and probably most feasible 69 suggestion is to
limit the media's access to the crime scene. 7 ° Possibilities include setting
up a "broadcast area" near police lines for bulletins and interviews, 171
setting up a "briefing area" for off-the-record information where no cameras
or recording equipment would be allowed, 172 establishing a police hotline
163. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 106, 121 (police survey where 65% of the
police chiefs felt live coverage endangered hostages and 100% felt live coverage should be
discontinued).
164. See CIA REPORT, supra note 42, at 1, 5.
165. See Mendelsohn, Socio-Psychological Perspectives on the Mass Media and Public
Anxiety, JOURNALISM Q. 514 (1963).
166. See generally TASK FORCE, supra note 95 (The task force was composed mainly of
police and governmental officials); Police, Media, And Terrorism, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Dec. 5, 1977, at 46 (package of suggestions prepared by Maurice J. Cullinane,
former Washington, D.C. police chief) [hereinafter Cullinane].
167. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 10.
168. See Cullinane, supra note 166 (This is an important distinction because under
constitutional analysis, much stricter scrutiny is given to any content-based regulation).
169. See discussion infra at notes 313-331.
170. Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 33, 43 & 44; TASK FORCE, supra note 95, at
9; Cullinane, supra note 166, at 46; Mann, supra note 144; Paust, supra note 13, at 672.




that would be updated continuously, 1'3 appointing an official police
spokesperson to give periodic briefings, 74 and restricting direct contact with
the criminal during an ongoing crime. 1 75  Another non-content related
suggestion is to restrict the use of cameras and lighting or allow only lone
camera shots. 176 Finally, some suggest limiting the number of reporters
allowed on the scene by using pool reporters to cover activities on behalf of
all news organizations and agencies. 77 One journalist, himself having been
held hostage, proposed that a committee of editors in the city experiencing
the incident be empowered to declare and enforce a "news emergency"
under which certain rules of the profession be suspended and where
protecting or, at least, not endangering the lives of hostages would be top
priority. Anyone violating this rule would be subject to disciplinary action
by his employer.178 It has been suggested that instead of regulating the actual
on-the-scene press activities, the law enforcement agencies could offer
training to media representatives in handling hostage situations. It is felt that
through this educational process the media would become more aware of the
problems and be better able to understand the police requests made and
consequently be more apt to follow them. 1
79
B. Content-related Suggestions
The content-related suggestions can be further divided into two more
groups: limitations on what information is to be released and requirements of
specific information to be released.
Limiting information: Suggestions to limit information include: Police
tactical information which could prejudice the lives of hostages or potential
victims 80s should not be released;' 81 any inflammatory or aggravating
173. Id.
174. Id. See also TASK FORCE, supra note 95, at 729.
175. Cullinane, supra note 166, at 46.
176. Id.
177. Id. See also Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843, 874 at n.17 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (the media argue that pools are time-consuming to establish, raise questions about
which news organization should be permitted in the pool, and imply that news editors will be
inclined to delegate responsibility for sensitive coverage to reporters whom they do not
know); Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 733. However, as Justice Powell noted in Saxbe, pools are
effectively used in other situations (trials, White House press coverage, etc.).
178. See CHARLES FENYVESi, THE MEDIA& TERRORISM 28,30 (1977).
179. See Terry, supra note 10, at 775.
180. See Chris Elkins, Caging the Beasts, Political Violence and the Role of the Media:
Some Perspectives, 1 POL. COMM. & PERSUASION 79, 98 (1980) (an example of endangering
the life of a potential victim rather than a hostage is the news media broadcast that the armed
vest worn by President Ford could only be pierced by a Springfield 303 rifle bullet).
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information should be delayed until the incident is over; 182 sensationalism
should be avoided; 183 reports should be confined to police disseminated
information only, at least until the incident is over; 184 "how to" information
relating to terrorist tactics should be avoided;1 85 and the name of any
individual or group claiming responsibility for a bombing should be
withheld.
186
Some suggest that because one of the underlying causes of
publicity-seeking crimes is that more conventional means of communication
seem unavailable, 8 7 the media should provide increased access to the
conventional media to representatives of minority and non-establishment
points of view.188 One suggestion is to set aside one hour per week for
presentation of messages by the public to be apportioned on a
first-come-first-served basis and/or a representative spokesperson system.
8 9
C. Providing Information
Most authorities agree that at least the media should strive to give a
balanced treatment of the phenomenon.' 90 They should provide information
from official sources in answer to the criminal's self-serving statements.' 9'
They should give follow-up coverage of the incident; for example, they
should cover the law enforcement and judicial responses to the criminal and
his actions. 92 Some feel that media has the responsibility to educate the
public concerning the impropriety of taking innocent lives in order to
publicize demands and grievances, the relative infrequency of such acts, the
legitimate needs of law enforcement in a democratic society, and the
181. See TASK FORCE, supra note 95, at 729.
182. Id. See also Mann, supra note 144, at 672.
183. See TASK FORCE, supra note 95, at 729.
184. See Cullinane, supra note 166, at 46.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See van der Vat, supra note 41, at 27; Catton, supra note 55, at 705.
188. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 50; Pohlmann & Foley, supra note 1, at
35]; Terry, supra note 10, at 773-74.
189. Terry, supra note 10, at 773-74.
190. See TASK FORCE, supra note 95, at 367-68; Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at
27; Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 740; Paust, supra note 13, at 672. Note that however balanced
the coverage is, the pervasive influence remains. Any publicity-whether it put them in a
good light or not-is gratifying to an expressly-oriented terrorist. See Catton, supra note 55,
at 729.
191. See TASK FORCE, supra note 95, at 729.
192. Note, however, that the current statistics of success and failure would be a deterrent
to future criminals. See note 86, supra.
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non-romantic aspects of terrorism. 193 The media do indeed contribute to the
problem of publicity-seeking crime. Is it not too much to hope that they
would also contribute to its solution?
Perhaps it is too much to expect of the media. Since 1941, the media
have been urged to police themselves.' 94 And yet, it took a flurry of
incidents in 1977195 to even get some "guidelines" proposed and randomly
adopted. 96 Western media officials are now aware of the dangers inherent
in the coverage of publicity-seeking crimes but the competitive pressures are
strong, 197 "professional judgment" may be unattainable,' 98 and the industry
is fragmented in nature and therefore hard to control from within.' 99
The competitiveness of news organizations,200 their fear of being
"scooped" by the opposition, 201 and their aforementioned quest for larger
audiences and prestige 20 2 combine to encourage rather than discourage
escalated reporting techniques and sensationalistic coverage. Many police
officials, in fact, believe that it is the competition between newsmen,
inspired by their respective news organizations, that lies at the root of the
problem.203 An individual reporter who might refrain from covering a
particular event for personal ethical reasons will more often succumb to the
193. See Mann, supra note 144, at 740.
194. See Terry, supra note 10, at 747; H.A.A. Cooper, Terrorism and the Media, 24
CHrrv's LAW J. 226, 230 (Sept. 1976); Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 46;
Pohlmann & Foley, supra note 1 at 35.
195. The first quarter of 1977 saw more than the usual number of publicity-seeking
crimes: February 8 through February 10, Anthony Kiristsis held a mortgage company
president hostage for sixty-three hours gaining a live news conference to state his views;
February 14, Frederick Cowan held two captives in a New York factory then committed
suicide; March 7 through March 9, Cory Moore took two captives and later received a
telephone call from President Carter; March 9 through March 11, Hanafi Muslims took three
Washington, D.C. buildings and 134 hostages. Terry, supra note 10, at 745.
196. Id. at 776.
197. See Research Study, supra 41, at 30. See also, text at notes 67-70, supra, and
200-206, infra.
198. See Terry, supra note 10, at 760. Seealso, text, supra at notes 207-214.
199. See, Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 427 U.S. 539, 550 (1976). See also, Jaehnig
supra note 13, at 727.
200. See Research Study, supra note 41, at 30; Right, Wrong, supra note 11, at 45; Jaehnig,
supra note 13 at 726, 736; Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 25.
201. See Pohlmann & Foley, supra note 1, at 35; Terry, supra note 10, at 768; Crisis Cop
Raps Media: Hostage Squad's Frank Bolz Asks Press to Police Itself, MORE, June 1977 at 19
[hereinafter Crisis Cop]; Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 25.
202. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 25.
203. See Crisis Cop, supra note 201, at 19; Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 726.
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subtle persuasion of potential career enhancement. 204 Network policies of
recruitment and advancement assure that newsroom policies rather than
philosophical principles succeed in network news.205 Newspaper staffers
also conform to newsroom policies due to the somewhat more subtle factors
of socialization within the job environment and esteem for superiors.20 6
Reporters are seeking to establish the reputation of being first with the news
and first with the viewers. Neither factor is conducive to operating a
self-regulated industry. Neither is either factor conducive to responsible
reporting.
The media industry argues that they are a profession and that like any
other recognized profession---e.g. doctors or lawyers-should be allowed to
regulate themselves. However, journalists are not now and have never been
truly considered "professionals." 207 They have no intense period of
specialization; they, in fact, abhor responsibility for their judgments and
actions;2°8 they tend to place greater emphasis on economic gain rather than
personal service; they have no comprehensive self-governing organization;
and they have no true Code of Ethics subject to clarification and
interpretation by the courts.20 9 In truth, there is no reason to expect the
industry to be "professional" enough to regulate itself.
Finally, self-regulation itself is an almost impossible task given the
vast number of organizations nationwide with no central authority.20 The
National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB"), which most television
stations belong to and which has been instrumental in regulating such areas
as the family viewing hour,2" is the nearest thing in the industry to a central
authority; however, membership is not mandatory. 212  Even the United
States Supreme Court has openly recognized the problems inherent in
fragmented self-imposed restraints: 213 reporters from distant places are
unlikely to be guided by their own standards and state courts have real
204. See Warren Breed, Social Control in the News Room: A Functional Analysis, 33 Soc.
FORCES 326, 329-30 (1955); Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 742.
205. Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 742.
206. Breed, supra note 204, at 329-30.
207. See Terry, supra note 10, at 760-61.
208. See Jaehnig supra note 13, at 732-39.
209. See Jack M. McLeod & Searle E. Hawley, Jr., Professionalism Among Newsmen, 41
JOuR. Q. 529, 530 (1964). Factors from a list of eight criteria relevant to deciding if an
occupation is a profession are found in this publication.
210. See Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 727, 736; Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 427 U.S.
539, 550 (1976).
211. See Marc A. Franklin, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAW (2d ed. 1982).
212. Id.
213. See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 550 (1976).
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practical difficulties in controlling newspapers or broadcasters outside of
their jurisdiction.21 4
All of this being true, still no one outside of government has seriously
considered anything more than self-regulation. Why?
VI. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging freedom of speech or of the1,21S
press ....
The First Amendment has stood as a bar to government regulation of
the media for 200 years. And yet, as Thomas Emerson has observed, "[t]he
outstanding fact about the First Amendment today is that the Supreme Court
has never developed any comprehensive theory of what that constitutional
guarantee means and how it should be applied in concrete cases. ''216 Despite
the apparent unequivocal command of the First Amendment, a majority of
217the Court has never supported the absolutist approach of interpretation.
Whole areas or forms of expression have been held outside the scope of
constitutional protection.21 8 Even with regard to protected speech, the Court
frequently uses a balancing approach weighing the government concern
involved in the regulatory scheme against the speaker's, writer's and/or
society's interest in the expression.21 9 Within this balancing approach, the
Court has on occasion found that certain categories of speech required a
lower level of protection.220 Nonetheless, the First Amendment continues to
214. Id.
215. U.S. CoNST. Amend. I.
216. See Emerson, supra note 128.
217. Only Justices Black and Douglas have subscribed to a literal interpretation of the
First Amendment. See generally Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960);
Countryman, Justice Douglas and Freedom of Expression, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 301. See also
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 398 (1967) (Black concurring); 385 U.S. at 401 (Douglas
concurring); Rosenblatt V. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 90 (1966) (Douglas dissenting), 383 U.S. at 95
(Black dissenting).
218. "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
219. Franklin, supra note 211, at 34.
220. Obscenity is one example. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
See-generally Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist
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maintain a somewhat preferred position in constitutional analysis, 2 I and
when the press uses it as their shield or sword it could be a potent and
valuable weapon.
There are two basic types of government interference with First
Amendment freedoms: content-related and content-neutral. 222
Content-related regulation pertains to controlling what is said while
content-neutral regulation applies to the manner in which it is said or, as
applied to the press, the manner in which the information is received. The
importance of the distinction is that normally the government bears a heavy
burden in overcoming the presumption that content-based regulation is
unconstitutional while the interests are more evenly balanced if a
content-neutral regulation is at issue.
223
A few words should be said at this point concerning the unique status
of the electronic media (television and radio). The Supreme Court has been
willing to recognize a limited distinction between printed and electronic
media.224 Rationales for the different treatment of the broadcasting industry
include: (1) airwaves are in the public domain and, as such, the grant of a
license is a privilege, not a right;22 5 (2) due to a scarcity of airways, some
regulation must occur so as to guarantee the public an uncluttered,
comprehensible broadcast;22 6 (3) the unique power of the medium;227 and
(4) the pervasive and intrusive nature of the medium. 228  The Court has
View, 68 GEO. L. J. 727 (1980); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First
Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113 (1981).
221. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). But see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
222. See Tribe, supra note 148, at 580-81; Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 36.
223. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 36.
224. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386, 388 (1969).
225. See Comment, The First Amendment and Regulation of TV News, 72 COLUMBIA L.
REv. 746 (1972) [hereinafter Regulation of TVNews]; Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41,
at 45. "A licensed broadcaster is 'granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable
part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public
obligations."' Columbia Broadcast Service v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (quoting
Office of Comm'n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F. 2d 994, 1003 (1966).
226. See Regulation of TV News, supra note 225 at 766; Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra
note 41, at 45.
227. See Regulation of TV News, supra note 225 at 765-66; H.R. REP. No. 349, 92nd
Cong., 1st Sess. 61-63 (1971); Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 45.
228. H.R. REP. No. 349, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 61-63 (1971); Bassiouni, Perspectives,
supra note 41, at 45; RedLion, supra note 224, 395 U.S. at 387; Pacifica, supra note 224, 438
U.S. at 748. Other distinctions can be drawn between broadcasting, particularly television,
and the print media: (1) the reader of a newspaper can at any time go directly to what interests
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upheld regulation of the broadcasting medium by the FCC229 who has been
empowered by the Communications Act of 1934 to grant renewable licenses
on the basis of a "public interest, convenience, or necessity" standard. 3°
Although the FCC has no power of censorship nor power to interfere with
the right of free speech, 23' the Commission is specifically directed to
consider the demands of the public when promulgating rules and
regulations 232 and prescribing restrictions and conditions233 upon obtaining
a grant,234 renewal,235 or modification 236 of a license. However, although
there are numerous legal areas of content-regulation by the FCC and
Congress, 237 the Commission has never taken action against a license based
him and skim or ignore the rest; in broadcasting, the choice is made for the listener by the
broadcaster: the speed, content and sequence are fixed; (2) the role of sound: written messages
are not communicated unless they are read, and reading requires an affirmative act; an
ordinary habitual television watcher could avoid messages only by the affirmative act of
frequently leaving the room, changing the channel, or doing some other such affirmative act;
(3) a person who knows he is appearing on television may alter his behavior because of it; and
(4) television is not neutral; it represents a coherent world of images and messages serving its
own institutional interest. See Franklin, supra note 211, at 716-17.
229. See, e.g., Red Lion, supra note 224, 395 U.S. at 387; Pacifica, supra note 224, 438
U.S. at 748; FCC v. RCA Comm'n., Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
230. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307, 309 (1970).
231. See id. at § 326.
232. See id. at § 303.
233. See id. at § 326.
234. See id. at §§ 307(a), 309(a).
235. See id. at § 307.
236. Id.
237. For example,
1) covert sponsorship of broadcast activities forbidden - 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1)
(1970);
2) airing of rigged quiz shows forbidden - § 509(a);
3) obscenity - In re Application of WDKD for Renewal of License, 33 F.C.C. 250
(1962);
4) broadcasting obscene language - 18 U.S.C. §1464 (1970) (making obscenity,
indecency or profane language a criminal act);
5) defamation - Trinity Methodist Church, S. v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932)
cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933) (denial of license renewal);
6) Fraud contests - In the Matter of KWK Radio, Inc., 34 FCC 1039 (1963) (license
revocation);
7) Illegal lotteries - WRBL Radio Station, Inc., 2 FCC 687 (1936); 18 U.S.C. §
1302 (1970);
8) Harmful medical advice - KFKB Broadcasting Assn. v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C.
Cir. 193 1) (denial of license renewal).
9) Gambling information - Community Broadcasting Service, Inc., 20 FCC 168
(1955) (denial of license renewal).
10) No mechanically reproduced production of news or other material "in which
element of time is of special significance" made without announcement of such.
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238
on improper news reporting,2 8 and the Supreme Court, when confronted
with news-related issues, has failed to distinguish between the two
mediums. 239 It is only within the last ten to fifteen years that the
broadcasting industry, particularly news reporting, has grown to have such a
pervasive influence on our society. Our government, including the
Supreme Court, has not assimilated this change into its constitutional
analysis quite so quickly. However, the basis for a valid distinction
regarding news reporting is there and should never be forgotten.
There are actually four forms of control over the media the government
has used: prior restraints, subsequent punishments, access restrictions, and
FCC regulations. With each type of restraint, the analysis differs.
A. Prior Restraint
Considered the most pernicious form of regulation, prior restraints are
extremely hard, if not impossible, for the government to justify. A prior
restraint is considered, in many ways, to be more inhibiting than a
subsequent punishment or an access restriction. As the United States
Supreme Court has said,
It is likely to bring under government scrutiny a far wider range of
expression; it shuts off communication before it takes place;
suppression by a stroke of the pen is more likely to be applied
than suppression through a criminal process; the procedures do
not require attention to the safeguards of the criminal process; the
system allows less opportunity for public appraisal and criticism;
and the dynamics of the system drive toward excesses, as the
history of all censorship shows. 24
The true "muscle" in a system of prior restraints is the fact that once an
injunction is issued, the party against whom it is issued must obey the
injunction until it is stayed,24' vacated, or reversed on appeal and should he
be held in contempt, he is usually not permitted to assert the invalidity of the
underlying order.242 The Fifth Circuit has noted, however, that the media
present special problems in contempt proceedings.243 It has recognized that
47 CFR 73.118, 73.288, 73.653 (1971).
238. See Regulation of TV News, supra note 225, at 748.
239. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
240. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 589-90 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (quoting Emerson, supra note 128 at 5-6).
241. State and federal courts commonly provide that a single appellate judge may stay the
order of a lower court. See Franklin, supra note 211 at 62.
242. See id. at 60.
243. See United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972).
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timeliness of the publication of news is sometimes all-important. 244 Thus,
"where the publication of news is sought to be restrained, the incontestable
inviolability of the order may depend on the immediate accessibility of
orderly review., 245 "[N]ewsmen are citizens, too. They too may sometimes
have to wait. They are not yet wrapped in any immunity or given the
absolute right to decide with impunity whether a judge's order is to be
obeyed or whether an appellate court is acting promptly enough. 246
Near v. Minnesota247 was the first case involving press censorship and
prior restraint to come before the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Hughes,
writing for the majority, noted, "The main purpose of such constitutional
provisions is to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had
been practiced by other governments." 248 However, he also suggested that
the prohibition against prior restraints is not absolute, 249 noting that
limitations on First Amendment protection might be recognized in the
following situations: (1) to "prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting
service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops" (troopship exception);250 (2) to enforce the "primary
requirements of decency" against obscene publications; 251 (3) to protect the
community "against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by
force of orderly government; '252 and (4) to enjoin "against uttering words
that may have all the effect of force.'253
Forty years later, in the "Pentagon Papers" case,254 the Supreme Court
255
was still unwilling to declare an absolute ban against prior restraints.
Although rejecting by six to three the government's effort to restrain the
publication of classified materials on the Vietnam War, the Justices, in their
concurrences and dissents, discussed the times when prior restraint might be
permitted. Justice Brennan would have upheld the troop/ship exception as
256the only exception. Justices Stewart and White would have upheld a
244. Id. at 512.
245. Id.
246. Id. (internal citation omitted).
247. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
248. Id. at 714.





254. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
255. See id. at 714.
256. See id. at 726-27.
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prior restraint where disclosure would "surely result in direct, immediate,
and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people. 257 Justices Marshall,
White, Stewart and Burger felt that a prior restraint might be okay had
Congress legislated it but that it was "inconsistent with the concept of
separation of powers for th[at] Court to use its power of contempt to prevent
[certain] behavior." 258 Justice Blackmun subscribed to a system of
balancing.
259
Near concerned a total restraint on a future publication by a newspaper
while the Pentagon Papers case involved publishing material about an event
that was history. Nebraska Press Association v. Stewart260 provides a case
more directly analogous to a terrorist situation in that it involved only a
temporary restraint on publication26' and an urgent ongoing situation in the
context of pretrial publicity. 262  Even so, the Court decided that other
alternatives were available and therefore a resort to prior restraints was
unconstitutional.263 It should be noted, however, that the Court went through
a detailed analysis of the record considering the nature and extent of the
pretrial news coverage, alternative measures, how effective a restraining
order would be, and the precise terms of such an order.264 A four-prong-test
can be deduced from the Court's analysis and was enunciated by Justice
Powell in his concurrence.265 A prior restraint may issue only when there is a
showing that (1) there is a clear threat to the governmental interest, (2) "such
a threat is posed by the actual publicity to be restrained," (3) "no less
restrictive alternatives are available" and (4) "previous publicity or publicity
from unrestrained sources will not render the restraint inefficacious. 266
257. Id. at 729.
258. Id. at 741.
259. See id. at 761.
260. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
261. The temporary nature of the order did not persuade the Court. In fact, it noted that in
New York Times Co. the burden on the Government was not reduced by the temporary nature
of a restraint. Id. at 559. The Court also discussed the nature of delay in the news industry
concluding that the element of time is important if the press is to "fulfill its traditional
function of bringing news to the public promptly." Id. at 560-561. The Court also expressed
a skepticism about any measure which "would allow government to insinuate itself into the
editorial rooms of this Nation's press." Id. (quoting Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418
U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J., concurring)).
262. See id. at 542.
263. See id. at 570.
264. Id. at 562-70.




Closely related to prior restraints are the "clear and present danger
' 267
and "national/state security' ' 261 cases. The "clear and present danger"
doctrine originated during the World-War-I-era in Schenk v. United States
269
and concerned subversive advocacy. The original test was "whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent., 270 Subsequent cases have added a
requirement of immediacy.27' As stated in Landmark Communications v.
Virginia,272
the [clear and present danger] test requires a court to make its own
inquiry into the imminence and magnitude of danger said to flow
from the particular utterance and then to balance the character of
the evil, as well as its likelihood, against the need for free and
unfettered expression. The possibility that other measures will
serve the State's interests should also be weighed.273
As one can see it is hard to distinguish between the requirements
necessary to overcome a prior restraint and the requirements of the clear and
present danger test. Appropriately, it has been suggested that the clear and
present danger test (i.e. suppression is all right if the harm sought to be
avoided is specific, the suppression sought to be suppressed is likely to cause
that harm, and the threatened harm is imminent)274 is the framework for the
Supreme Court's analysis of most content-related speech.275
Although the Supreme Court has long realized that the "State has [a]
necessary interest in ... preventing the community from being disrupted by
,,216 i
violent disorders endangering both persons and property, it is unlikely
that prior restraints or regulations relating to the intimidation,
277 imitation,271
and immunization 279 factors will be allowed. They lack immediacy of
267. Schenk v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
268. Franklin, supra note 211, at 260; U.S. v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.
Wis. 1979); N.Y. Times v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
269. Schenk v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
270. Id. at 52.
271. The publication must "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to
our Nation or its people." N.Y Times, 403 U. S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also,
Brandenburg, supra note 267, 395 U.S. at 447-48.
272. Landmark Comm'ns v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
273. Id. at 843.
274. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 38.
275. KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 61, at 1183-93.
276. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972).
277. See text at note 89-94, supra.
278. See text at note 95-107, supra.
279. See text at note 108-111, supra.
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danger and sufficient empirical data to link the broadcast to the harm.2"'
However, dissemination of information highly likely to jeopardize the lives
of hostages or victims is a specific harm of a very grave nature which is sure
to result if the publication of the information is not suppressed. It is highly
likely that a narrowly drawn regulation affecting such dissemination would
be constitutionally permissible.
B. Subsequent Punishment
Although the Court seems adamant about its refusal to authorize prior
restraints except under the most compelling situations, it seems to have no
difficulty with the concept of criminal or civil sanctions.28' In the Pentagon
Papers case, 282 Justices Stewart, 28 3 White, 284 Marshall, 285 and Burger 286
expressed the idea that Congress had the power to enact specific and
appropriate laws and that they would have no difficulty sustaining
convictions under such laws. However, the precedents dealing with content
regulation by criminal or civil sanction are few and distinguishable.287
Most recently, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,288 the Court held
that a state interest of the highest order was necessary to punish publication
of truthful information lawfully obtained.289 The statute in that case,
punishing dissemination of the name of juvenile offenders, was held
280. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 59, at 1193-96; Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra
note 41.
281. See, e.g. N.Y. Times v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 730-33; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
720 (1931); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 588 n.15 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
282. N.Y. Times, supra note 254, 403 U.S. at 713.
283. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
284. Id. at 734-39 (White, J., concurring) ("However, these same members of Congress
appeared to have little doubt that newspapers would be subject to criminal prosecution if they
insisted on publishing information of the type Congress had itself determined should not be
revealed.. .I would have no difficulty in sustaining convictions under these sections on facts
that would not justify the intervention of equity and the imposition of a prior restraint.").
285. Id. at 743 (Marshall, J., concurring).
286. Id. at 752 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("I should add that I am in general agreement
with much of what Mr. Justice White has expressed with respect to penal sanctions
concerning communication or retention of documents or information relating to the national
defense.").
287. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (concerning publication
of a juvenile offender's identity); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (dealing with a
group libel law); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (dealing with an
unconstitutionally vague statute); Landmark Commissioners v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829
(1978); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
288. Daily Mail, supra note 287, 443 U.S. at 97.
289. Id. at 103.
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unconstitutional. Although finding the state interest of protecting the
reputation of juveniles not compelling enough, the Court makes strong
mention of the fact that the statute did not truly serve that state interest
because by punishing newspapers only, it allowed dissemination by other
sources.290 It noted, too, that although other states had the same interest, they
had found an alternative way of accomplishing their objective.291 Very
possibly, had the statute included all media in its prohibition and had the
Court found no alternative means, the statute would have passed
constitutional muster.
Civil action against the media is, again, a fairly undeveloped area, and
usually deals with the electronic media. The cases tend to fall into two main
categories: (1) where the content of the broadcast has an immediate impact
on the viewer (direct harm), and (2) where the viewer of the broadcast
engages in conduct that harms a third party (indirect harm).292 The direct
harm cases entail a factual situation where the viewer tries something he has
seen done on television, has heard on the radio, or read in a book and
consequently harms himself. The clear and present danger doctrine has been
the analytical framework used by the court in these few cases, 293 although294
the test seems to turn on a reasonable man/likelihood of harm analysis.
The indirect harm cases encompass the controversial "influence of
television violence" 295 and imitative crime 296 cases. Incitement to
290. Id. at 104-05.
291. Id. at 105.
292. Franklin, supra note 211, at 221.
293. See Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981). See also
DeFilippo v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., No. 79-3678 (R.I. Sup. Ct. June 8, 1980) (unpublished
opinion). It is generally held, often as a result of "Printer's Ink Statutes," that publishers are
not liable for harm caused to readers by advertisements unless the editor knew of the danger
created by the advertised product. Franklin, supra note 211, at 225. Perhaps the same standard
should be used with news reporting. Publishers will not be liable for harm caused by
publication of a terrorist event (remember terrorists are using the media for publicity just as
any vendor is) unless the editing reporter knew such publication was dangerous--either to the
public at large (such "knowledge" at this date would be hard to prove) or to specific
individuals (hostages or potential victims).
294. See Walt Disney, id., 276 S.E.2d at 583 ("Pied Piper" discussion).
295. See, e.g., Zamora v. Columbia Brdcst. Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979) where
a fifteen-year-old convicted of killing his eighty-three-year-old neighbor claimed that while
he was between the ages of five and fifteen he had become desensitized to and intoxicated by
violence because of extensive viewing of televised violence and that the network had incited
him to duplicate the acts he saw on television. The trial judge dismissed the complaint. See
also Franklin, supra note 211, at 232.
296. See, e.g., Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal App. 3d 488 (1981); Niemi v.
Nat'l Broadcasting Co. Inc., 458 U.S. 1108 (1982) (involving the artificial rape of a 9 year old
girl allegedly connected to the viewing of the show "Born Innocent"); Weirum v. RKO
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violence297 is the test being used and, so far, empirical data proving the
causal link seems to be the missing factor in holding a station liable.298
However, in a recent California Supreme Court case,299 a radio station was
held liable for a death caused by a teenage driver who was speeding to find a
moving radio van whose driver was offering prizes to the first to find them.
Liability was imposed on the broadcaster for urging listeners to act in an
inherently dangerous manner.
300
Particularly in ongoing situations involving hostages or potential
victims, media reporters should be able to predict with a reasonable degree
of certainty that a harmful act is likely to result from certain broadcasts.3 '
That the act is physically perpetrated by a third party should make the media
no less culpable. 302 Media corporations should be held financially
responsible for harm caused to innocent victims through the fault of the
media's employees. They profit from the broadcast of the incident and in a
just and fair system, that profit should be made available to compensate the
victim of the activity.30 3 However, either a new judicially created tort theory
of recovery or an adoption of a statute may be needed. 304 At least one
commentator has suggested such a statute.3°5
General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975) (involving a traffic fatality allegedly caused by the
enticement of a radio station promotion reward program).
297. See Olivia N., id., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 495. See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969). Appellant's counsel in Olivia N. defined incitement as "telling someone to
go out, encouraging them, directing them, advising them." 126 Cal. App. 3d at 491 n.l. See
also Franklin, supra note 211, at 227, n. 1.
298. See Michael I. Spak, Predictable Harm: Should the Media Be Liable?, 42 OHIo ST.
LAwJ. 671, 680 (1981).
299. Weirum, supra note 296, 539 P.2d 36.
300. In Weirum, the court emphasized that the youthful contestant's reckless behavior was
"stimulated" by the radio station's broadcast, and that the broadcast repeatedly and actively
encouraged listeners to speed to announced locations. Id, 539 P.2d at 40.
301. See Spak, supra note 298, at 671.
302. See Wierum, supra note 296, 539 P.2d at 40.
303. See Spak, supra note 298 at 680-81.
304. See id. at 671.
305. "Any person, partnership, joint venture, or corporation that produces any work
designed to be shown to the public will be liable for the physical harm caused to a member of
the public as a result of the showing of that work if: (a) it is shown by clear and convincing
evidence that the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was a reaction by some member of the
public to viewing the work; (b) it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the act that
was reproduced was excessively violent in fact; and (c) the producers knew or should have
known that the depiction of this violent act created a probability of its being reproduced in
society." Id. at 679-80.
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Any statute, criminal or civil, 30 6 must be narrowly and precisely
drawn. It must show a compelling necessity for regulation 0 7 and that the
government's objective cannot be achieved through any alternative
means. 30 8 The regulation must be specific enough to withstand overbreadth,
vagueness, and possible equal protection analysis,309 and to put the affected
actors on fair and sufficient notice that their conduct is illegal. 310 It should
allow only limited official discretion.311 A statute too vague or indefinite, in
form or as interpreted, will be considered void on its face.
312
C. Access Restrictions
It has been repeatedly held that "the First Amendment does not
guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the public generally., 31 3 However, in recent cases, the inquiry
has begun to turn on what information the public should have access to.
Furthermore, the role of the press seems to be evolving into that of a
surrogate for the public.314 The most recent cases have involved access to
prisons315 and access to court proceedings. 316 Both areas deal with public
institutions; however, the Supreme Court has upheld regulations related to
media access to prisons 317 while holding unconstitutional restraints on trial
coverage.3 Is Distinctions and similarities can be drawn between the two and
history seems to be the biggest factor.
306. The standards of certainty in statutes punishing offenses is higher than in those
depending primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement. See Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
307. See Juanita Jones & Abraham Miller, The Media and Terrorist Activity: Resolving
the First Amendment Dilemma, 6 OHIo N. U. L. REv. 70, 79-81 (1979).
308. Id. at 79, 81.
309. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 41.
310. Winters, supra note 306, 333 U.S. at 509-10.
311. See Jones & Miller, supra note 307, at 79, 81.
312. Winters, supra note 306, 333 U.S. at 509.
313. Branzburg, supra note 276, 408 U.S. at 684. See also Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. 555; Houchins, supra note 239,438 U.S. 1; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974);
Saxbe, 417 U.S. 843.
314. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573; Houchins, 438 U.S. at 39; Pell, 417 U.S.
at 839-40, (Douglas, J., dissenting); Saxbe, supra note 177, 417 U.S. at 861-64 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
315. See Houchins, supra note 239,438 U.S. 1; Saxbe, supra note 177,417 U.S. 843; Pell,
supra note 313, 417 U.S. 817.
316. Richmond Newspapers, supra note 313,448 U.S. at 555; Gannet Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368 (1978); Nebraska. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
317. See cases cited supra note 316.
318. See cases cited supra note 317. Note, however, that no case in either of these areas
has drawn a majority: Richmond Newspapers had six concurrences, one dissent and one
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Historically, trials have been public. The Supreme Court has found that
public trials are necessary to a proper functioning of our political system.319
Where the public goes, so goes the press. Historically, the public has not
had access to prisons; therefore, regulating media access would not be
discriminatory against the press, but would merely eliminate a special
privilege the press has vis-i-vis the public.320 Similarly, restricting media
access to the scene of a publicity-seeking crime would surely be within
constitutional bounds. The Supreme Court has specifically said,
"Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to scenes of crime or
disaster when the general public is excluded., 32' Except to know whether
they are in immediate danger, the public has no real interest in the details of a
crime--other than morbid interest in the tragedy of others on which our
society seems to thrive. Therefore, the press, having no greater access
rights than the general public, could constitutionally be restricted in their
access to publicity-seeking crimes and criminals.
In considering alternative measures available in the trial case, the Court
found that the State rather than the media had viable alternatives to choose
from for fulfilling its goal and that those alternatives were less restrictive
than refusing access to the media.322 In the prison cases, however, the Court
noted that the media, rather than the government, had alternative means to
fulfill its goals of getting information about prison conditions such as
interviewing recently released prisoners, legal advisors, doctors, and others
who were in and out of the prisons.323 In much the same way, and for many
of the same reasons, it is the press rather than the government who has
alternative means to achieve its goals in a publicity-seeking crime situation.
Information can be obtained from police officials during the incident and
from released victims, hostages, and the criminals themselves after the
incident.
The Court also considered the gravity of the threatened harm. Although
expressing that fairness of trial was a concern of the highest order, the Court
Justice took no part in the decision; Nebraska Press had six concurrences; Gannett had three
concurrences, four concurrences in part and dissent in part; Pell had three dissents and one
concurrence and dissent; Saxbe had four dissents; Houchins had one concurrence, two
Justices took no part and three dissents.
319. See Richmond Newspapers, supra note 313, 448 U.S. at 573.
320. See Pell, supra note 312, 417 U.S. at 831.
321. Branzburg, supra note 276, 408 U.S. at 684-85. See also Pell,supra note 312, 417
U.S. at 834; Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
322. Richmond Newspapers, supra note 313,448 U.S. at 580-581.
323. Saxbe, supra note 177, 417 U.S. at 848.
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also has noted that pretrial publicity did not always result in an unfair trial.324
In addition, the result of an unfair trial could be cured through a reversal,
although the Court noted that this was not the best remedy.325 The harm
threatened in the prison cases, however, was personal physical violence and
once perpetrated could never be undone.326 The Court was concerned with
the fact that press attention made certain inmates virtually public figures
within the prison society, gaining them a disproportionate degree of
notoriety and influence among their fellow inmates. These inmates tended to
become a source of substantial disciplinary problems. This fact, combined
with the substantial security needs in an environment with such a large
capacity for violence was considered a compelling state interest by the
Court.3 27 This is a strong point in favor of the constitutionality of restricted
media access during publicity-seeking crimes.
The Court has never ruled directly on the problems with obtrusive
equipment and the sheer numbers of reporters328 although restrictions on
numbers have been allowed if a reasonable basis for selective classification
is given.329 It seems, however, that in a case where such equipment and a
crowd of reporters could directly jeopardize lives in an on-going situation,330
restrictions on the use of cameras, the number of reporters,33' the type of
324. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976). See also Richmond
Newspapers, supra note 313,448 U.S. at 564.
325. Richmond Newspapers, supra note 313, 448 U.S. at 555.
326. See Pell, supra note 312, 417 U.S. at 822-23, 826-27, 848-49.
327. Id.
328. Note, however, that at least one Justice has expressed an opinion on restrictions of
media equipment. Justice Stewart, concurring in Houchins v. KQED, refers to "effective"
access:
A person touring Santa Rita jail can grasp its reality with his own eyes and ears. But
if a television reporter is to convey the jail's sights and sounds to those who cannot
personally visit the place, he must use cameras and sound equipment. In short,
terms of access that are reasonably imposed on individual members of the public
may, if they impede effective reporting without sufficient justification, be
unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there to convey to the general public
what the visitors see.
Houchins, supra note 239, 438 U.S. at 17. The plurality opinion, however, upheld the
restriction against the use of cameras and tape recorders on the monthly tours. Id. at 5, 16.
See also Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker, Maryland House of Delegates, 310 A.2d 156 (1973);
Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977).
329. Los Angeles Free Press, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 9 Cal App.3d 448 (1970); Cable News
Network, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
330. See supra text accompanying notes 122-127.
331. One suggestion might be to limit the number of reporters to only those trained in
terrorist events.
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cameras, telephone access, helicopter coverage, etc., would be
constitutionally permissible.
D. FCC Regulation
As has been detailed previously, 332 the Supreme Court, at least in areas
other than news coverage, has been willing to make a distinction between the
printed and electronic media.333 It is time for that distinction to flow over
into the area of news broadcasting. News broadcasting poses unique
problems not present in the traditional free speech case 334 and certainly
inconceivable to the framers of the Constitution.335 It is pervasive,336
becoming less and less edited,337 and gives the impression of "authenticity
per se. '3
38
In addition to the above, the media wields unprecedented power.339
And yet, access by the average citizen is extremely limited. As John F.
Kennedy once said, "Those who make peaceful evolution impossible, make
violent revolution inevitable. 340 In other words, those who make peaceful
evolution possible, make violent revolution unnecessary. If publicity is what
these criminals so desperately desire, why should the media be allowed to
force them to violence to attain such publicity? Shouldn't those with full
control of all the resources be made to share those resources, which are
supposedly part of the public domain, to a small extent with the public?
Although the Court has never recognized a general right of public
access to the airwaves,34' it has recognized a limited right to reasonable
332. See supra text accompanying notes 224-230.
333. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
334. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 50, n.55 (1976) (citing Red Lion); Columbia
Broadcasting v. Democratic Nat'l Comm, 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973). Television and radio
have a greater impact than any other media. The public places heavy reliance on television as
its primary source of information concerning public events. The psychological impact of
television news is said to be far different from that of the printed press. Whereas a newspaper
account provides a narration of an event, television news frequently purports to present the
event as it actually occurred, with the impression conveyed to the viewer that he himself is
perceiving the event. H.R. REP. No. 349, 92nd Cong., 1 Sess. 61-63 (1971); Regulation of
TVNews, supra note 225; The Coming Explosion in TV News, supra note 75, at 46.
335. See Catton, supra note 55 at 704.
336. Pacifica, supra note 140, 438 U.S. at 726.
337. See Jaehnig, supra note 13, at 719.
338. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 21.
339. See note 59, supra.
340. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 12.
341. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981).
[Vol. 60
PUBLICITY-SEEKING CRIMES
access under the Fairness Doctrine. 342 The Fairness Doctrine is a
requirement placed on radio and television broadcasters that adequate
coverage be given to public issues and that such coverage must be fair in that
it accurately reflect the opposing views. This must be done at the
broadcaster's own expense and initiative if sponsorship and suggestions are
available from no other source.343 A number of years ago a proposal was
made by the FCC344 that would have allowed broadcasters to opt for public
access to the airwaves system in lieu of complying with the commission's
traditional standard for the Fairness Doctrine. Under the proposal, a
broadcaster would presumptively be in compliance if four conditions were
met: (1) one hour per week should be set aside for spot announcements and
lengthier programming which would be available for the presentation of
messages by members of the general public; (2) half of this time should be
allotted on a first-come-first served basis on any topic whatsoever; (3) both
parts of the allocation scheme should be "nondiscriminatory as to content
with the licensee"; and (4) the broadcaster would still be required to ensure
that spot messages or other forms of response to "editorial advertisements"
are broadcast. 345 This proposal should be reappraised by the FCC and
considered as a mandatory access rather than an option to the broadcasters in
hopes that given a less violent opportunity at mass communication, many
publicity-seeking criminals could be placated.346
The FCC is empowered to prescribe restrictions and conditions on
obtaining a license based on a public interest, convenience, or necessity
standard.34 7 It is also possible, but not very likely, that television and radio
licensees could be restricted in their coverage of publicity-seeking crime that
relates to sensationalism, publication of "how to" information, and
publication of the names of groups or individuals claiming responsibility for
various crimes based on a public interest justification. However, it must be
remembered that the FCC has no power of censorship nor any power to
interfere with the right of free speech,348 so just how far the regulations can
go is probably limited by the same standards mentioned in the prior restraint,
subsequent punishment, and access restrictions areas.
342. Id. at 400.
343. See Red Lion, supra note 333, 395 U.S. 367, 377.
344. 41 RAD. REG. 22d 1311 (P & F 1977).. See also, Terry, supra note 10, at 773-74.
345. 41 RAD. REG. 22d at 1335 (P & F 1977). See also, Terry, supra note 10, at 773-74.
346. See Bassiouni, Perspectives, supra note 41, at 30; Pohlmann & Foley, supra note 1, at
35; van der Vat, supra note 41, at 27.
347. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307, 309 (1970).
348. Id. at § 326.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In summation, then, what can be done? The problems created by media
coverage of publicity-seeking crimes are, again, that: (1) unbalanced media
coverage enhances the environment of fear and coercion the terrorists seek to
generate, (2) such coverage may encourage other individuals to engage in
such conduct, (3) such coverage will dull the sense of outrage and contempt
in the general public; and (4) such coverage can endanger hostage's lives and
interfere with effective law enforcement.
Unfortunately, little can be done about the first three concerns within
the parameters of the First Amendment, with the possible exception of the
imitation factor. The courts have been unwilling to accept the imitation
reasoning when applied to civil suits based on television viewing. However,
with publicity-seeking crimes, the additional factor of gratification is added
and the sociological data is a bit more developed and accepted. Were the
Court to accept the information and related data on operant conditioning and
vicarious reinforcement, it is possible that some form of prior restraint or
subsequent punishment might be allowed. It is also doubtful that any prior
restraint or subsequent punishment would be allowed in the other two areas
because there is no empirical data proving such results. However, it is
possible, though not probable, that in the public interest the FCC could
require its licensees to provide balanced coverage of the phenomenon in the
form of follow-up coverage relating to the sanctions imposed against the
terrorist; information from official sources in answer to the criminal's
self-serving statements; information concerning the relative infrequency of
such acts; the impropriety of taking innocent lives; the non-romantic aspects
of terrorism; and information emphasizing the individuality of the people
involved. Of course, an additional aspect of FCC regulation includes the
aforementioned mandatory access requirement under the Fairness Doctrine
and promulgation of other restrictions and conditions to obtaining a license.
By limiting media access to the scenes of on-going crimes, all three
concerns could be lessened in their impact. By not showing the actual crime
being perpetrated on the screens of viewers' living room television sets,
feelings of anxiety and fear could be lessened. By not showing the criminals
in the act of committing the crime, much of the gratification is removed from
the act for the criminal and for those who might imitate him. Again, by not
continually showing the gory details as they happen, the viewing public
becomes less immunized against the atrocities of crime. The reasons for
limiting access are not related to the intimidation, imitation, or immunization
factors but are based on the safety of potential victims. However, as long as
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the regulation is justified by a sufficient state interest, any overflow benefits
are a windfall.
When media coverage becomes an immediate threat to the lives of
potential victims of publicity-seeking crimes, it is very possible that finely
tailored government regulation is possible in all four forms: prior restraints,
subsequent punishment, access restrictions, and FCC regulations.
First and foremost, the Government should require that on-the-scene
coverage should be limited to only those reporters who have had training in
terrorist situations. Such selective access could be supported as long as it
furthers a compelling governmental interest identified by narrowly drawn
standards. 34 Secondly, all suggestions made regarding broadcast areas,
briefing areas, police hotlines, police spokespersons, direct contact with
criminals during ongoing situations, and so forth 350 could be justified based
on the fact that the public has no need or right to be at the scene and the press
has no more rights than the public, the lack of governmental alternatives in
dealing with the problem, and the gravity of the harm.35'
It is quite possible that prior restraints could operate to restrain a
newsman from publishing information such as police strategies, activities, or
plans or the presence of hidden persons or escaping hostages. Such
publication would "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable
damage to [our Nation's]... people. 352
However, it is more likely that subsequent punishment would be met
with less resistance. The state interest in saving lives is of compelling
importance, there are no less restrictive alternatives (as long as access is also
being limited), and it would apply to all media. It is very likely that civil
sanctions would be allowed in these situations. Media reporters, especially
those trained in terrorist tactics, should know what information, if released,
would endanger lives. Such knowledge should make them and their
respective employers liable for any harm caused because of their actions. 35
3
Three of the purposes for constitutionally guaranteeing freedoms of
expression and of the press were 1) the advancement of knowledge and
discovery of truth, as an essential element of self-governance, 2) the
provision of a safety valve by substituting reason for force, and 3) the
349. See Sherril v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 126 (D.C. CA 1977); Watson v. Cronin, 384 F.
Supp. 652, 660 (D. Colo. 1974).
350. See discussion in text and notes 169-179, supra.
351. See discussion in text and notes 321, 267-275, supra.
352. N.Y. Times v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring with whom
White, J. joins).
353. See discussion in text at notes 301-305, supra.
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providing of a framework within which the conflict necessary to the progress
of society could take place without destroying society.354 Media coverage
of publicity-seeking crimes thwarts all three objectives.
As to the purpose of advancement of knowledge, in the technological
world of today, the majority of the public is informed through television
news.355 Should a person decide that he or she does not want his or her
children to watch a publicity-seeking crime as it takes place - a decision
which, given the chance, most persons would probably make - he must
completely give up his constitutionally guaranteed source of information
(since he has no control over the sequence of the news). Secondly, by giving
publicity and gratification to these criminals, newspersons are encouraging
substitution of force for reason - which is a complete contradiction to the
very purpose they serve. And, finally, instead of providing a framework
within which conflict can take place without destroying society, they provide
a framework within which to destroy society. Justice Frankfurter
summarized this idea in Beauharnais:
It may be argued, and weightily, that this legislation will not help
matters; that tension and on occasion violence... must be traced to
causes more deeply embedded in our society than [television news
coverage] ..... Only those lacking responsible humility will have a
confident solution for problems as intractable as [publicity-seeking
crime] .... This being so, it would be out of bounds for the judiciary to
deny the legislature a choice of policy, provided it is not unrelated to the
problem and not forbidden by some explicit limitation on the State's
power. That the legislative remedy might not in practice mitigate the
evil, or might itself raise new problems would only manifest once more
the paradox of reform. It is the price to be paid for the trial-and-error
inherent in legislative efforts to deal with obstinate social issues ....
Every power may be abused, but the possibility of abuse is a poor
reason for denying [a state] the power to adopt [appropriate]
measures .... 356
There is a problem created by the media's coverage of
publicity-seeking crimes. Surely there is a solution. Government should be
allowed to experiment with remedies-with the judiciary system an
ever-present watchdog-until such solution can be found.
354. See discussion in text at notes 128-131, supra.
355. See note 69, supra.
356. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 261-63 (1952).
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VIII. APPENDIX A: NON-STATE SPONSORED TERRORIST CRIMES
AFFECTING THE UNITED STATES AND/OR ITS CITIZENS
COMMITTED FROM 1958 TO 1982.11,
1958: June 27: Thirty U.S. Marines kidnapped by Communist guerillas on
Cuba, near the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay. All are eventually
released unharmed; October 12: Bombing of the Hebrew Benevolent
Congregation Temple in Atlanta.
1961: May 1: First ever U.S. aircraft hijacked and forced to fly to
Communist Cuba by Puerto Rican born Abntulio Ramirez Ortiz.
1963:16th Street Baptist Church bombing by a member of the Ku Klux Klan
("KKK") killing four girls aged eleven to fourteen; November 22: President
John F. Kennedy is assassinated.
1965: February 21: Black power leader Malcolm X shot dead during a public
meeting in New York City; The KKK murdered Viola Liuzzo, while
transporting civil rights marchers; New York police thwart an attempt to
dynamite the Statue of Liberty, Liberty Bell, and the Washington Monument
by three members of the pro-Castro Black Liberation Front ("BLF").
1966: NAACP leader Vernon Dahme assassinated by the KKK.
1968: February 21: Delta Airlines DC8 hijacked to fly to Havana, Cuba for
political asylum; April 4: Black civil rights activist Rev. Martin Luther King,
Jr. shot dead in a hotel in Memphis by James Earl Ray; April 23: Students for
a Democratic Society and Student Afro-American Society held a dean
hostage at Columbia University; June 6: Senator Robert F. Kennedy
assassinated by Jordanian terrorist, Sirhan Sirhan, in Los Angeles; Further
terrorist threats were received from Arab groups attempting to obtain
Sirhan's release; August: Abbie Hoffman threatened to spike the water of
Chicago with LSD prior to Democratic Convention; August 28: John
Gordon Meir, U.S. ambassador to Guatemala is murdered by a rebel faction,
becoming the first ever American ambassador to be assassinated by
terrorists; October 12: A U.S. Army officer serving as an advisor to the
Brazilian army is gunned down in his home in Sao Paulo, Brazil by left-wing
guerillas, who falsely claim he is a Vietnam "war criminal."
357. List of Alleged Terrorist Acts 1945-2000,
http://www.southemct.edu/-seymour/cases/terror/terlst.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2008); List
of Terrorist Incidents, http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/List of terrorist-incidents
(last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
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1969: September 4: American Ambassador Charles Elbrick kidnapped in
Brazil by left-wing terrorists and freed after fifteen terrorists were released
from jail; October: Members of the Weathermen, including Prof. Bill Ayers,
staged riots over a four day period in Chicago resulting in one death and
massive amounts of property damage.358
1970: March 6: The Greenwich Village Townhouse explosion was the
premature detonation, by members of The Weathermen, of a bomb intended
for an officers' dance at Fort Dix in New Jersey and for Butler Library at
Columbia University; August 24: The Army Mathematics Research Center
on the University of Wisconsin-Madison campus was blown up resulting in
one death; October 22: An anti-personnel time bomb explodes outside a San
Francisco church, the Black Liberation Army ("BLA") is suspected.
1970-1972: The Jewish Defense League ("JDL") was linked with a bomb
explosion outside of Aeroflot's New York City office, and a detonation
outside of Soviet cultural offices in Washington, D.C.; A JDL member
allegedly fired a rifle into the Soviet Union's mission office at the United
Nations ("U.N."); Conspiracy to blow up the Long Island residence of the
Soviet Mission to the U.N. by JDL.
1971: The BLA is suspected (and in 2007 convicted) of shooting and/or
bombing numerous police officers and/or cars and/or offices in various cities
around the country and running a guerrilla warfare school in Georgia.
1972: January 27: Two policemen suspected to have been murdered by
members of the BLA; May 11: U.S. Army headquarters in Frankfurt,
Germany, attacked by Red Army Faction car bomb killing one American
officer and injuring thirteen people; Three more U.S. servicemen injured in
another Red Army Faction car bomb attack on the U.S. Army headquarters
at Heidelberg, Germany, later that month; October 27: Police car bombing in
Los Angeles claimed by Afro-American Liberation Army ("AALA");
December: A travel agency in Queens, New York is bombed by FIN, a
Cuban exile group opposed to the government of Fidel Castro; December 11:
The VA-Cuba Forwarding Company is bombed in New York City, FIN
suspected; December 28: A Brooklyn, New York bartender is held for
ransom by the BLA.
1973: January 7: Mark Essex, a former Black Panther, shot nineteen people
at a Howard Johnson hotel in New Orleans and sets fire to the hotel; A New
York City transit detective is killed and ten law enforcement personnel are
358. WILLIAM AYERS, FUGITIVE DAYS: A MEMOIR (BEACON PRESS 2001).
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shot (four by machine gun) in and around New York City by the BLA; Two
members of BLA were arrested with a car full of explosives.
1974: February 4: American heiress Patricia Hearst kidnapped by
Symbionese Liberation Army terrorists and participated in a raid on the
Hibernia Bank in San Francisco; March 1: Saudi Arabian embassy in
Khartoum, Sudan, seized by Black September terrorists who murdered two
American diplomats; September 8: Bomb killed eighty-eight people on
TWA Flight 841, attributed to Abu Nidal and his terror organization;
December 11: Bomb set off by the Puerto Rican nationalist group FALN in
East Harlem.
1975: January 24: FALN bomb the Fraunces Tavern in New York City,
killing four and injuring more than fifty; April 19: FALN set off four bombs
within a forty-minute period in Manhattan, New York injuring at least five
people; December 29: Bomb explodes at New York's LaGuardia Airport,
killing eleven and injuring seventy-five, no arrests made and the reason for
this attack remains unknown.
1976: September 10- 11: Croatian Freedom Fighters hijacked a TWA airliner
from New York to Paris, a police officer was killed and three injured by a
bomb that contained their communiquds in a New York City train station
locker; September 21: Chilean exile Orlando Letelier was assassinated in
Washington, D.C. by the Chilean government.
1977: March 9: Three buildings in Washington, D.C., including city hall,
were seized by members of the militant African-American Muslim Hanafi
sect and over 100 hostages were taken, one bystander was killed, civil rights
activist Marion Barry was shot in the chest; August 3: FALN bombed the
offices of Mobil and a Department of Defense building and warned that
bombs were located in thirteen other buildings, including the Empire State
Building and the World Trade Center. A bomb was later found in the AMEX
building.
1978-1995: The Unabomber kills three and injures twenty-nine in a string of
anti-technology bombings.
1979: June 9: FALN exploded a bomb outside of the Shubert Theatre in
Chicago, injuring five people; June 18: NATO's Supreme Allied
Commander Europe General Alexander Haig (an American) escaped death
after a German Red Army Faction bomb exploded under a bridge just after
his motorcade had passed over it; November 4: Iran hostage crisis, a 444-day
standoff during which student proxies of the new Iranian regime held
sixty-six diplomats and U.S. citizens hostage inside the U.S. embassy in
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Tehran; November 15: Unabomber puts bomb on American Airlines Flight
444 which fails to detonate.
1980: March 15: Armed members of FALN raided the campaign
headquarters of President Jimmy Carter in Chicago and the campaign
headquarters of George H. W. Bush in New York City, tying up hostages and
vandalizing the offices and later sent threatening letters to delegates; June 3:
A bomb destroyed most of the exhibits in the Statue of Liberty Story Room,
Croatian separatists were suspected; August 13: Air Florida flight from Key
West to Miami hijacked by seven Cubans and flown to Cuba, six further U.S.
airliners were hijacked to Cuba over the next month.
1981: May 16: Puerto Rican Resistance Army placed a bomb in the toilets at
the Pan Am terminal of the John F. Kennedy Airport in New York; August
31: A large bomb exploded in the car park of the USAF base at Ramstein,
Germany, injuring twenty people, the Red Army Faction claimed
responsibility; September 15: Red Army Faction terrorists made an
unsuccessful rocket attack on the car of a U.S. Army commander in West
Germany.
1982: August 11: A bomb exploded on Pan Am Flight 830, en route from
Tokyo to Honolulu, killing one teenager and injuring fifteen passengers;
December 12: An anti-nuclear protestor held eight tourists hostage in the
Washington Monument, in Washington, D.C. before he was shot dead by a
police sniper.
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1983: April 18: Sixty-three people, including the CIA's Middle East
Director, were killed and 120 injured in a 400-pound suicide truck bomb
attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, responsibility was claimed
by Islamic Jihad; October 23: A suicide truck bomb in Beirut, Lebanon
destroyed a U.S. Marine Corps base killing 241 Americans, Islamic Jihad
claimed responsibility; November 9: A time bomb consisting of several
sticks of dynamite exploded at the U.S. Senate in response to the U.S.
invasion of Grenada, a group known as the Armed Resistance Unit claimed
responsibility; November 15: U.S. Naval officer was shot by terrorist group
359. See List of Various Alleged Terrorist Acts 1945-2000,
http://www.southemct.edu/-seymour/cases/terror/terlst.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2008);




in Athens, Greece, when his car stopped at a traffic light; December 12: The
U.S. Embassy in Kuwait was targeted by Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia terrorist
who attempted to destroy the building with a truck bomb, the attack was
foiled by guards and the device exploded in the Embassy forecourt killing
five people; December 17: U.S. Army Brigadier General James Dozier was
kidnapped from his home in Verona, Italy by Italian Red Brigades terrorists,
he was held for forty-five days until Italian Special Forces rescued him.
1984: August: The Rajneeshee cult spreads salmonella in salad bars at ten
restaurants in Oregon to influence a local election, 751 people were sickened
and more than 40 were hospitalized.
1985: October 11: Arab anti-discrimination group leader Alex Odeh was
killed when a bomb exploded in his California office.
1988: April 12: Japanese Red Army terrorist Yu Kikumura was arrested at a
rest stop on the New Jersey turnpike in possession of pipe bombs on his way
to New York.
1990: November 5: Meir Kahane, head of Israel's Koch party and founder of
the American vigilante group, the Jewish Defense League, was assassinated
in a New York hotel lobby by early elements of Al Qaeda.
1993: January 25: Mir Aimal Kansi, a Pakistani, fired an AK-47 assault rifle
into cars waiting at a stoplight in front of the CIA headquarters, killing two
and injuring three others; February 26: A coalition of five groups (Jamaat
Al-Fuqra', Gamaat Islamiya, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, National Islamic Front),
including Ramzi Yousef and financed by Khaled Shaikh Mohammed, killed
six and injured over 1,000 people in a World Trade Center bombing; June: A
New York City landmark bomb plot failed.
1994: March 1: Rashid Baz kills a Hasidic seminary student and wounds
four on the Brooklyn Bridge in New York City in response to the Cave of the
Patriarchs Massacre in Palestine.
1995: March 8: Terrorists in Karachi, Pakistan, armed with automatic rifles,
murdered two American consulate employees and wounded a third as they
traveled in the consulate shuttle bus; April 19: the Oklahoma City bombing
kills 168 people, nineteen of them were children; October 9: An Amtrak
Sunset Limited train is derailed by antigovernment saboteurs near Palo
Verde, Arizona, one person is killed and seventy-eight are injured.
1996: July 27: Centennial Olympic Park was bombed, killing one and
wounding 111.
1997: February 24: Ali Abu Kamal opens fire on tourists at an observation
deck atop the Empire State Building in New York City, killing a Danish
national and wounding visitors from the U.S., Argentina, Switzerland, and
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France before turning the gun on himself, a handwritten note carried by the
gunman claimed that this was a punishment attack against the "enemies of
Palestine."
1998: August 7: Al-Qaeda bombed U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya,
killing 225 people and injuring more than 4,000.
1999: April 20: Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold killed thirteen students and a
teacher and wounded twenty-four others in the Columbine High School
massacre; December 14: Ahmed Ressam is arrested on the U.S.-Canada
border in Port Angeles, Washington, where he confessed to planning to
bomb the Los Angeles International Airport as part of the 2000 millennium
attack plots.
2000: The last of the 2000 millennium attack plots failed, as a boat meant to
bomb U.S.S. The Sullivans sank; October 12: U.S.S. Cole is bombed, killing
seventeen U.S. sailors and wounding forty off the port coast of Aden,
Yemen, by Al-Qaeda.
2001: September 11: Attacks by Al-Qaeda kill 2,997 in a series of hijacked
airliner crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City and the
Pentagon in Virginia, a third plane crashed in Pennsylvania after an apparent
revolt against the hijackers by the plane's passengers; October: Anthrax
attacks on U.S. Congress and New York government offices and on
employees of television networks and tabloids occurred; December 12: JDL
plot by Chairman Irv Rubin and follower Earl Krugel to blow up the King
Fahd Mosque in California and office of Lebanese-American Rep. Darrell
Issa is foiled; December 22: Richard Reid, attempting to destroy American
Airlines Flight 63, was subdued by passengers and flight attendants before
he could detonate his shoe bomb.
2002: May: Luke Helder injures six people by placing pipe bombs in
mailboxes in the Midwest; July 4: An Egyptian gunman opened fire at an El
Al ticket counter in Los Angeles International Airport, killing two Israelis
before being killed himself; October: John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd
Malvo conducted the Beltway Sniper Attacks, killing ten people in various
locations throughout the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.
2004: August 28: Shahawar Matin Siraj and James Elshafay were arrested
for planning to bomb the 34th Street-Herald Square subway station in New
York City during the 2004 Republican National Convention.
2006: March 3: Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar, an Iranian-born graduate of
the University of North Carolina, drove an SUV onto a crowded part of
campus, injuring nine; August 10: A major antiterrorist operation disrupted
an alleged bomb plot targeting multiple airplanes bound for the U.S. flying
[Vol. 60
Number 3] PUBLICITY-SEEKING CRIMES 533
through Heathrow Airport; August 30: An Afghani-Muslim hit nineteen
pedestrians, killing one, with his SUV in the San Francisco Bay area.
2007: March 5: A Rikers Island inmate offered to pay an undercover police
officer posing as a hit man to behead New York City Police Commissioner
Raymond Kelly and bomb police headquarters in retaliation for the
controversial police shooting of Sean Bell; Seung-Hui Cho killed
thirty-three people including himself in the Virginia Tech Massacre; May 7:
Six men inspired by jihadist videos were arrested in the U.S., in a failed
homegrown terrorism plot to kill U.S. soldiers; June 3: A homegrown
Islamist terrorism plot-intended to destroy the fuel supply system for John
F. Kennedy Airport in New York City and cause a large amount of
causalities by blowing up the connecting pipeline system that runs through
densely populated neighborhoods-was thwarted.
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